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Netflix Inc. 
Netflix is the number one streaming content 
provider in the world, having over 117,5 million 
subscribers worldwide. The firm has been able to 
systematically increase the price of its streaming 
packages without compromising subscriber 
growth and has yielded its investors remarkable 
returns in 2018, with its price per share increasing 
68,88% YTD.  
 A simultaneous growth in price and subscriber 
base of this order is only possible in a market with 
minimal competition, which is a consequence of 
Netflix’s first mover advantage. Naturally, this 
growth didn’t go unnoticed by the media and 
technology giants, such as Amazon, Apple, 
Google, Facebook or Disney, which have shown 
their interest in expanding their operations into 
the streaming content business. 
Being so, one critical question that poses is 
whether the market is accurately pricing the 
threat of competition into Netflix’s stock price or 
whether it is overvalued as a consequence of this 
risk being overlooked. 
The conclusion of this dissertation is that the 
market is overlooking this risk and that the 
Netflix’s stock is overpriced. As a result, the 
underlying recommendation is that investors 
should sell this stock. 
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        The aim of this dissertation is estimating the fair value of one unit of Netflix’s common stock, 
at the end of the year 2018. Two valuation methodologies are utilized, the first being the Discounted 
Cash-Flow (DCF) approach and the second being the relative valuation methodology, being the 
multiples used the P/E, EV/EBITDA and EV/Sales. The valuation output is then compared to the 
equity research report of Morgan Stanley on Netflix. 
        The valuation output is that Netflix is overvalued in the market, being the fair value of one 
unit of common stock estimated to be $239,35 at the end of 2018, while the stock is trading at 
$328,53 on the 15th of May 2018. Hence, the recommendation produced in this dissertation is a sell 
recommendation. This recommendation is only a function of the DCF approach, since the relative 
valuation outputs were not consistent across the different multiples used nor with the value 
computed through the DCF approach. Morgan Stanley estimates the value of one unit of common 
stock at the end of 2018 to be $275, which is a higher valuation than the one estimated in this 
dissertation and also yields an opposite recommendation, as Netflix’s stock was trading at $227,58 
at the time of valuation. This difference is mainly explained by different assumptions regarding the 
evolution of Netflix’s FCFFs, as the WACC in both valuations differs only 12 basis points and the 
perpetual growth rate differs only 17 basis points. 
- 
        Esta dissertação pretende estimar o justo-valor de uma ação da Netflix no final de 2018. Para 
tal, dois métodos de avaliação são utilizados, sendo o primeiro o método de Discounted Cash-Flow 
(DCF) e o segundo o método de relative valuation, sendo os múltiplos utilizados o P/E, 
EV/EBITDA e o EV/Sales. O resultado obtido nesta avaliação é posteriormente comparado com o 
equity research report produzido pela Morgan Stanley sobre a Netflix. 
        A avaliação realizada estima que as ações da Netflix estão sobreavaliadas no mercado. O 
justo-valor de uma ação é estimado ser $239,35 no final de 2018, no entanto, as mesmas estão a 
ser transacionadas no mercado a 15 de Maio de 2018 por $328,53. Assim, a recomendação 
produzida é de que os investidores devem vender as ações em questão. Esta recomendação é feita 
apenas em função do método DCF, dado que os resultados obtidos através da relative valuation são 
inconsistentes entre os diferentes múltiplos usados e inconsistentes com o resultado obtido através 
do método DCF. A Morgan Stanley estima o justo-valor de uma ação da Netflix no final de 2018 
em $275. Este valor é superior ao estimado nesta dissertação e resulta numa recomendação oposta, 
dado que, à data da avaliação realizada pela Morgan Stanley, as ações da Netflix transacionavam 
a $227,58. A diferença entre as avaliações é essencialmente explicada por diferentes pressupostos 
relativos à evolução dos FCFFs, visto que o WACC e a taxa de crescimento em perpetuidade 
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      1. Introduction 
 
Every rational investor’s aim is to maximize the value of its investments. In order to do so, 
investors attempt to make informed, wise decisions, based on unbiased and thrust worthy data and 
studies. The objective of this dissertation is to provide such a study, specifically, an equity valuation 
on a well-known firm for every teenager and young adult, Netflix Inc. Therefore, the research 
question this thesis aims to answer is: what is the fair value of one unit of Netflix’s common stock, 
at the end of the year 2018? 
This study is of the highest importance as the whole stock market system is based upon equity 
valuation. From an investor’s point of view, since stock prices fluctuate every minute, especially 
with the development of information channels, it is more important than ever to understand which 
price movements are associated with the firm’s potential to create value and the ones that are 
speculative or market over reactions. From a firm point of view, a proper equity valuation enables 
firms with sound business models to command a premium in the market, while those with weak 
fundamentals see their prices dropping over the long-term. 
This dissertation starts with the Literature Review, in which the most relevant equity valuation 
models are presented, alongside with an explanation of their applicability, advantages and 
drawbacks. The second stage consists of an overview of Netflix’s business, highlighting its 
business model and operating performance over the recent past as well as its strengths and the risks 
it faces. On the third stage the methods that are considered the most suitable to evaluate the 
company are applied and the last stage consists of the comparison of the valuation built on this 
dissertation with the equity research report produced by Morgan Stanley on Netflix. 
This project is not, however, free of limitations, as equity valuation is not an exact science. 
The process of valuing a firm is long, subjective and there is no recipe or pre-defined standard 
process generally accepted by all for valuing a firm. Furthermore, during this dissertation it was 
not possible to contact anyone from Netflix to access any additional information, which also 





      2. Literature Review 
      2.1. Cash-Flow Based Models 
 
Cash-flow based models are widely used and perceived as accurate and trustworthy. This 
dissertation will follow with a description of what cash-flows are and how they can be used to value 
an asset. 
      2.2. Discounted Cash-Flow Model (DCF) 
 
      The DCF valuation model, invented in the 1970’s, came to be used in any corporate asset 
valuation process (Luehrman, 1997). It is the most commonly used method among investment 
banks when evaluating firms and projects, as it is considered a precise and flexible method (Koller, 
et al., 2005). The premise behind this model is that the value of a firm derives from free cash-flows. 
As a result, cash movements are key in this type of valuation (Goedhart, et al., 2010). 
      In order to perform this valuation, we need to estimate, as precisely as possible, three variables: 
future cash-flows, the discount rate and the terminal value. By doing so, we can then determine the 
value of an asset, in our case, a firm, by the present value of the future expected cash-flows, 
discounted at a risk-adjusted rate (Damodaran, 2005) 
The Discounted Cash-Flow methodology allows us to either estimate the value of the whole 
firm, known as Enterprise Valuation Methods, or to estimate the value of a firm’s equity. 
      2.2.1. Enterprise Value Methods 
 
There are two cash-flow based methods that allow investors to evaluate entire enterprises: the 
Discounted Cash-Flow method, using the WACC as the discount rate and the Adjusted Present 
Value (APV) method. 
      2.2.2. DCF – Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
 














In this valuation method, the value of the firm is computed by discounting the future expected 
cash-flows at the risk-adjusted rate, which, in this case, is the WACC. However, since it is 
impossible to estimate all cash-flows ad infinitum, computing the Terminal Value is also necessary. 
The explanation of each parameter of the formula above follows. 
      2.2.2.1. Free-Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF) 
 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇(1 − 𝑇) + 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 −  ∆𝑁𝑊𝐶 
(Pinto, 2010) defines FCFF as “the part of the cash-flow generated by the company’s 
operations that can be withdrawn by bondholders and stockholders without economically impairing 
the company”. It is formally defined as a measure of performance, based on the net amount of cash 
generated by a company, including expenses, taxes, investments for the year and variations in 
working capital, as shown above. FCFF reflects all the cash-flows available for all financial parties. 
      2.2.2.2. Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  
𝐷
𝐷 + 𝐸
∗ 𝐾𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇) +
𝐸
𝐷 + 𝐸
∗ 𝐾𝒆  
(Gilbert, 1990) defines a discount rate as “the rate of return an investor would require to be 
induced to invest in the cash-flow stream being discounted”, meaning, the rate that fairly 
compensates the cash-flow risk taken by the investor. In this approach, that discount rate is the 
WACC, which combines the required return by the company’s debt and equity holders (Goedhart, 
et al., 2010). 
The WACC is a weighted average of two different variables, the first being the cost of debt 
(Kd) and the second being the cost of equity (Ke). What produces the weights is the underlying 
firm capital structure. The tax rate is included in the formula to allow the WACC to measure the 
impact of leveraging a firm, the tax shields (Luehrman, 1997). (Fernandez, 2010) thus defines the 






      2.2.2.2.1. Cost of Debt (Kd) 
 
Cost of debt measures the effective rate that a firm has to pay for its current debt. On the WACC 
computation it is considered the after-tax cost of debt. The reason for this lies on the fact that 
interest payments are a tax-deductible expense. (Goedhart, et al., 2010) states that analysts should 
compute this cost in different ways, depending on the different types of firms being analyzed. The 
author suggests that, for firms with publicly traded debt, analysts should consider the cost of debt 
to be equal to the Yield to Maturity (YTM), computed by the present value of the bond price and 
the promised cash-flows. However, if the firm’s debt is not traded often, the author suggests that 
the firm’s debt rating is used instead, as to produce a more accurate estimation of the YTM, using 
the firm’s marginal tax rate to keep the cost of debt on an after-tax basis. (Damodaran, 2001) states 
that, for firms without rating, a good estimate of their cost of debt would be computing the firms’ 
interest coverage ratio, since it puts more emphasis on the borrowings incurred in a recent past. 
      2.2.2.2.2. Cost of Equity (Ke) 
 
According to (Goedhart, et al., 2010), the cost of equity can be derived from the Fama & French 
3 Factor Model, the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
(Sharpe, 1964). (Damodaran, 2001) argues that the CAPM is the most commonly used method in 
the industry to reach the cost of equity.  
      2.2.2.2.2.1. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ [𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓] 
In this model, first proposed by (Sharpe, 1964), the cost of capital can be seen as a function of 
risk determined by three variables: the risk-free rate (rf), beta (β) and the market risk-premium, 
which is the difference between the market return (Rm) and the risk-free rate (rf). Beta is the only 
firm specific factor within the model, as it determines the degree of correlation of a firm with the 






       2.2.2.3. Terminal Value (TV) 
 
It is not possible to estimate all cash-flows ad infinitum. As a result, analysts must decide on 
the forecasted timeline, also known as explicit period, which is understood by the time a firm takes 
to reach a steady growth rate. Analysts’ explicit period tends to range between six and ten years, 
but this value can vary a lot depending on firm specificities. The next step consists of calculating 
the firm’s terminal value, i.e., calculating the firm value, in perpetuity, beyond the explicit period. 
(Damodaran, 2012) suggests three different approaches to estimate terminal value: liquidation 
value, multiples and stable growth model. The liquidation value approach estimates that the 
terminal value equals the estimated value of the sale of all the firm’s assets after repaying the debt. 
The multiples methodology considers that the value of the firm will be a multiple of its future 
earnings or book value. The third, and by far the most commonly used, the stable growth model, 
assumes that, after the explicit period, the firm will be growing at a stable growth rate which should 
be lower than the growth rate of the economy in which the firm operates. According to this last 
model, the terminal value of a firm goes by: 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 =  
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡+1
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
Finally, it is vital to refer the importance of the Terminal Value. (Schill, 2013) states that it is 
usually the largest component of value of a firm, representing, on average, between fifty and eighty 
percent of the total firm value, depending on how many years we have in annual forecasts. 
     2.3. Adjusted Present Value Model (APV) 
 
Even though the WACC is highly practical, keeping the calculations required to a minimum, it 
comes with drawbacks. The most common criticism to the WACC, presented by (Luehrman, 1997), 
is that it is applicable only to simple and static capital structures and that its application requires 
not only project by project, but also period by period adjustments, even within each project.  
Given the drawbacks regarding the DCF-WACC methodology, another method emerges that 
also has acceptance among the literature: the Adjust Present Value Model. 













      According to this methodology, as shown on the formula above, the value of a firm is computed 
discounting its FCFF at the Cost of Equity (Re), adding the present value of the expected tax benefit 
of debt financing, also known as Tax Shield (TS), and subtracting the expected costs of bankruptcy 
associated with debt financing, also known as financial distress costs (FD costs).  
      The first step of this methodology is, therefore, the calculation of the Unlevered Firm Value, 
i.e., valuing the firm as if it was financed exclusively using equity (Damodaran, 2012). 
      The second step consists of measuring the benefit resulting from debt financing. 
𝑃𝑉 (𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠) =  ∑








      Finally, regarding the third step, the expected costs of bankruptcy, (Damodaran, 2005) suggests 
that it is computed as follows:  
𝐸(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
(Graham, 2001) states that the optimal amount of debt varies from firm to firm. According to 
the author a firm should issue debt as long as the benefits of this issuance outweigh its costs. The 
third equation of this process estimates the costs associated with financial distress, which occurs 
when payment promises to creditors are broken or honored with difficulty (Brealey, et al., 2011). 
This equation is the one there is the most lack of consensus about. (Damodaran, 2005) argues that 
it is the larger issue with the APV methodology, as bankruptcy costs represent a vast portion of the 
valuation and they are difficult to quantify. Regarding the first term, probability of default, 
(Damodaran, 2012) suggests using publicly traded bond ratings as a proxy for the probability of 
default. In respect to the second term, the bankruptcy costs, (Damodaran, 2005) splits these costs 
into direct costs, composed by legal and administrative costs, and indirect costs, such as brand 
damage, loss of key employees of costumers or loss of investment opportunities. (Branch, 2002) 






      3. Equity Valuation Models 
 
There are two cash-flow based methods that allow investors to measure the value of equity of 
enterprises: discounting the Free Cash-Flow to Equity (FCFE) at the Cost of Equity method and 
the Dividend Discount Model (DDM). 
      3.1. Free Cash-Flow to Equity 
 









      The reasoning behind this method is exactly the same as the one of the FCFF. The expected 
future cash-flows are being discounted at the risk-adjusted discount rate. In this case, the discount 
rate is the cost of equity, since it is the required return investors demand for bearing the risk 
associated with the firm’s equity. Just as previously explained, since the estimation of the future 
cash-flows is impossible ad infinitum, calculating the terminal value is once again necessary. 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸 = 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑡) +  ∆𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 
One way to compute the FCFE is by, following the steps in the formula, converting the FCFF 
into the FCFE. In theory, due to the direct relations between the two methods, the equity value of 
a firm should be the same applying either method. In reality, however, the values usually 
marginally differ from one another. 
Alternatively, one may compute the FCFE directly by applying the following formula: 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 − ∆𝑁𝑊𝐶 +  ∆𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 
(Pinto, 2010) argues that an analyst should choose the FCFF approach if a firm is levered, has 
a negative FCFE or a changing capital structure, due to the fact that the cost of equity is more 








      3.2. Dividend Discount Model (DDM) 
 
The Dividend Discount Model (DDM) is the oldest of all valuation methods. (Damodaran, 
2012) describes this method as one that evaluates a business such that the value of a stock is the 
present value of the expected dividends on it. 
The price per share of a company is simply the value of the expected future dividend payments 
discounted at the cost of equity (Re). The complexities of this model come from the need to 
estimate the future dividends the firm will pay as well as the rate at which these will grow. In order 
to tackle this problem, one of two paths is usually taken: the Gordon Growth Model or the Two-
stage Growth Model. 
       3.2.1. Gordon Growth Model 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 =
𝐸(𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡+1)
𝑅𝑒 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
  
     The underlying assumption of this model is that the dividend a firm pays will grow at a fixed 
rate in perpetuity. (Damodaran, 2012) states that the usage of this model only makes sense for firms 
that are growing at a stable pace. Furthermore, (Pinto, 2010) notes that this method is extremely 
sensitive to the inputs for the discount rate (the cost of equity and the growth rate), making this 
method extremely exposed to valuation errors. 
      3.2.2. Two-stage Growth Model 
 









     Alternatively, the two-stage growth model allows analysts to incorporate two different “stages” 
of dividend growth forecasts in the model, i.e., one may estimate a dividend growth rate for the 
near future and another the growth rate for the dividends to grow at in perpetuity. This model is an 
improvement from the Gordon Growth Model in the sense that it allows analysts to adapt it to 







     4. Profitability Models 
 
     The line of thought behind these models is that the value created by a firm does not come from 
the fact that it generates positive earnings, but rather from the fact that it generates earnings that 
are superior to the required return on the capital invested. As a result, cash-flows are split into two 
categories: normal cash-flows, those the investor expects and requires upon making an investment, 
and excess cash-flows, those that surpass the required return on capital. As a result, (Damodaran, 
2012) states that the value of a firm can be expressed by the sum of the capital invested today and 
the present value of excess returns from existing and future projects. The two models that follow, 
the Economic Value Added Model (EVA) and the Dynamic Return of Equity (ROE) are the most 
popular within this category. 
     4.1. Economic Value Added (EVA) 
 
     The EVA methodology is an enterprise value methodology. The first step towards the usage of 
this model consists of defining EVA. 
 
𝐸𝑉𝐴 = (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶) ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
 
 As depicted above, EVA consists of the excess return on invested capital over the required 
return on capital (the WACC). In order to generate economic profit, the Return on Invest Capital 
(ROIC) should be higher than the WACC. 
 
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +  ∑










     In order to compute the enterprise value of the firm, one must follow the formula above, 
suggested by (Damodaran, 2012). As shown, the value of the firm derives from the sum of the 






    4.2. Dynamic Return on Equity Methodology (RoE) 
 
     The Dynamic RoE methodology is similar to the EVA methodology, being the major difference 
regarding the interpretation of the output. While the first method provides an enterprise value of 
the firm, the second provides the value of equity. 
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =  𝐸0 ∗  ∑






As we can see from the formula above, the underlying logic here is similar to the one 
explained in the EVA methodology: there will be value creation if the return on equity is higher 
than the cost of equity. 
Both profitability models analyzed are essentially built on accounting-based data. If the inputs 
of the model are not accurately reported, the underlying valuations will be poor and misleading. 
Furthermore, these models are more often used for short-term forecasting horizons, opposite to the 
cash-flow based methods. 
 
    5. Relative Valuation 
 
     The objective in this type of valuation is not to determine a firm’s intrinsic value, but rather to 
comprehend its position in relation to its peers. (Damodaran, 2012) states that it is a simple 
approach and its results are easier to interpret for all stakeholders than the ones from a DCF 
analysis. 
     “Properly executed, such an analysis can help a company to stress-test its cash-flow forecasts, 
to understand mismatches between its performance and that of its competitors, and to hold useful 
discussions about whether it is strategically positioned to create more value than other industry 
players are” (Goedhart, et al., 2010).  
     A relative, or multiples valuation, consists essentially of a two steps process, the first one being 





     5.1. Peer Group 
 
      The selection of a proper peer group is not an easy task, as it is not clear at which point should 
a company be considered “similar” to another. 
      (Damodaran, 2005) suggests that the firms from the peer group should belong to the same 
industry. The underlying assumption is that firms in the same sector are exposed to the same risks, 
growth and cash-flows. Finding such firms is not easy, therefore, there are other variables that 
could be considered, such as betas, earnings per share (EPS) or return on equity. 
      (Koller, et al., 2005) argues that the selection of the peers should lie essentially on statistics, 
such as Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) and long-term growth rates. Sometimes, however, such 
information is not available. According to the author, the process of selecting the right peer group 
is the one that distinguishes veteran analysts from newcomers. In order to do so successfully the 
author recommends that, after getting a preliminary list of the firms that operate in the industry, 
the analyst should proceed to study what are the reasons that explain the different multiples across 
the peer group. The analyst should fully understand the firm’s operations and financial specificities 
and only then will he be able to create an adequate peer group, which will provide a much better 
valuation than the simple average of many firms within the industry would. 
      5.2. Multiples 
 
In respect to the second point, the multiples to use, (Fernandez, 2002) offers a wide range of 







Among the multiples above, according to the author, the most popular are the Price to Earnings 
Ratio (P/E) and the EV/EBITDA. The popularity of the first comes from its simplicity on relative 
Source: (Fernandez, 2002) 





valuation or even on pricing Initial Public Offerings (IPO) (Damodaran, 2012). Other advantages 
are the fact that the P/E ratio links the firm value to profits and it also takes into account risk and 
EPS growth. (Koller, et al., 2005) identifies two drawbacks to the usage of this ratio. The first is 
the fact that it is dependent on capital structure. Managers can intentionally increase the P/E ratio 
by replacing debt with equity. The second is the fact that it is earnings based, meaning that it may 
include one-time events such as write-offs, and other non-operating items. Moreover, many firms 
have negative EPS, making the ratio useless to them. As a result, this ratio should be used for stable 
firms, with small growth and where big changes are not expected. 
Enterprise value multiplies, such as EV/EBITDA or EV/EBIT, are very popular as well since 
they measure the corporation capacity to have a positive cash-flow. Both ratios perform an asset 
valuation, therefore, to find equity value net debt must be deducted. With the assumption that the 
market value of debt can be priced with reliability, one can even assess the correct value for equity 
by this multiple (Pinto, 2010). (Liu, et al., 2002) states that enterprise value multiples yield more 
precise pricing than the P/E ratio since the first minimizes the problem related to the different 
capital structures. However, enterprise multiples have flaws of their own, by not including or 
reflecting variations that can happen either by changes in working capital requirements or capital 
expenditures (Fernandez, 2002). 
Multiples can be divided into three groups: current, trailing and forward. (Liu, et al., 2002) and 
(Kim & Ritter, 1999) recommend the usage of forward-looking multiples, due to increased 
valuation accuracy. (Koller, et al., 2005) also recommends the usage of forward multiples, rather 
than historical multiples. The author suggests that only if there are no reliable forecasts available 
should one use historical data and, if doing so, the data used should be as recent as possible and 
one-time events should be eliminated. 
At last, it is important to notice that multiples can be misleading. Managers and CEO’s are 
aware that multiples are a very important tool used by the market to value their businesses, for 






       6. Option Pricing Theory 
 
(Damodaran, 2012) states that option pricing theory can be useful to evaluate assets whose 
value varies depending on the intrinsic characteristics of options, such as a finite lifetime and value 
dependence on an underlying, and cannot be reached conventionally. As a result, it is used 
essentially to value oil, gas or mining companies, as their value is based upon the decision of 
drilling, or mining.  
There are two models to value assets within this methodology: the Black & Scholes model and 
the binomial model. (Luehrman, 1997) defends the usage of the Black & Scholes model rather than 
the binomial as it shares more inputs with the DCF methodology, which allows for a more logic 
comparison between the two. (Goedhart, et al., 2010) states that option pricing theory can be useful 
as a complement to other methodologies and that it should not be used in isolation. 
        7. Conclusion 
 
        Equity valuation is not an exact science. Resulting, there are several methods to evaluate the 
value of a business and no consensus among analysts as to which is the best. After the overview 
presented, regarding the different methods used across the industry, it is now time to select those 
that best fit Netflix’s specificities. 
        The first method presented, the DCF-WACC, will be the main method used to evaluate 
Netflix. As previously mentioned, (Luehrman, 1997) states that this method is ideally applicable 
for firms with static capital structures, which is the case of Netflix. The firm’s investor relations 
department stated that it will continue to finance its growth thought debt, as it is more efficient than 
issuing equity, given the low market interest rates and the tax deductibility of debt. Moreover, the 
company’s debt to equity ratio, in market values, is extremely low, 5,85% in 2017, for which the 
company does not expect to face financial distress costs even with some increase in its leverage.  
        The dividend discount model will not be used as Netflix does not pay nor ever paid a dividend 
to its shareholders. 
        The returns based models described will also not be used to value Netflix as they are 





        Option Pricing Theory also does not apply to Netflix as its assets do not have the intrinsic 
characteristics of options, such as a finite lifetime and value dependence on an underlying. 
        At last, relative valuation will be used as a complement to the DCF methodology. Three 
multiples will be used.  The first being the P/E multiple, the most widely used multiple according 
to (Fernandez, 2002). Despite the fact that this multiple yields the best results when applied to 
stable firms, with small growth and where big changes are not expected, this is a straightforward 
multiple to use, which is easy to understand by every party. Moreover, as the firm’s capital structure 
is not expected to change significantly in the future, the results from this multiple are expected to 
be reasonable. The two other multiples to be used will be enterprise value multiples: EV/EBITDA 
and EV/Sales. The EV/EBITDA is considered appropriate to measure Netflix’s value as the costs 
added back to the firm’s earnings, depreciations, amortizations, taxes and interest, do not truly 
reflect the costs of operating the business. Taxes are a function of tax rule and therefore unrelated 
to the profitability of the business. Interest payments are based on the firm’s financing rather than 
how it is managed and depreciations and amortizations are based on the management D&A 
policies, hence subjective. Moreover, using EV multiples allow the comparison of businesses with 
different capital structures, which is important given that Netflix’s peer group has companies that 
are very different from one another both in terms of business models and leverage policies. At last, 
the EV/Sales multiple will be also used. Unlike earnings, which are heavily influenced by 
accounting decisions on depreciation and amortization, R&D and extraordinary charges, revenue 
is relatively difficult to manipulate. Moreover, sales multiples are not as volatile as earnings 
multiples, making this multiple reliable for usage in valuation. The multiples used in this valuation 
will be forward multiples, as suggested by (Liu, et al., 2002), (Kim & Ritter, 1999) and (Koller, et 










Fig. 3 – Streaming Packages 
 







Netflix is a provider of streaming media services through which subscribers can access a wide 
range of television shows and movies over the internet. As depicted above, Netflix generates 
revenue from two sources, video content streaming services and DVD-by-mail services. 
Both are subscription based businesses. Using the first, subscribers pay a fixed monthly fee to 
access and stream as much content as they would like to watch. The content is available on a 
multitude of screens, among which smartphones, PCs, MACs, tablets, TV set-top boxes and Smart 






These packages are the same across all the markets Netflix operates at. The price does change, 
ranging from $7,99 to $13,99 in the US and from the US dollar equivalent of approximately $4 to 
$20 outside the US. The standard package is the most popular choice for new memberships. 
Using the second, DVD-by-mail, subscribers pay a monthly fee to be able to rent DVDs and 
Blu-Rays online and have them delivered to their place. Despite being one single firm, the DVD 
segment a totally separated from the streaming business: it has its own website, management team, 
benefits package for employees and headquarters.  
 
Source: Netflix Annual Report 2017 
Source: revenuesandprofits 









This service is only available on the US, being the prices on the table are the only ones 
practiced. 
      8.1. Content Sources 
 
Netflix gets content from two sources, licensing agreements and development of original 
content. A licensing agreement consists of a written agreement under which the creator of the 
content gives Netflix permission to use that property under specified parameters. Through this 
source of content, Netflix has been both acquiring long-tail content, from studios, at relatively 
cheap prices to build the size of its content offering and more expensive content to attract 
mainstream costumers from traditional entertainment sources. Historically, this was the model 
Netflix based its business upon. It was advantageous for studios given that it allowed them to have 
an alternative revenue stream to the traditional windows. However, with the increasing popularity 
of streaming services, studios have started noticing cannibalization of their standard revenue 
streams. As a consequence, studios started being less willing to license content to Netflix at 
reasonable prices. Furthermore, by only using content from third parties, Netflix would find itself 
with no chance of having more valuable content than its competitors, as content developers can 
license their content to plenty of distributors. 
Faced with these issues, Netflix has recently shifted its strategy towards the development of 
original content, in place of further investing into increasingly expensive licensing deals. In this 
field, its strategy can be broken down into three pieces. The first being the creation of content based 
on prior intellectual property, such as developments or continuations of old stories beloved by the 
public, which is a low risk investment in original content. The second being betting on brand new 
original content to clearly distinguish itself from its competition and the third the creation of 
Source: Netflix Annual Report 2017 






original content specific to a certain geography, to capture that audience and further expand their 
influence abroad.  
This recent focus of Netflix on the development of original content has issues of its own. 
Filmmakers usually desire to see their productions debut on “the big screen”, which has not been 
the destination of Netflix’s originals. Furthermore, Netflix does not share with the actors and 
producers the upside of a hit the same way a traditional studio does, as there are no box office 
revenues nor syndication revenues to share, i.e., whether the show is watched by 50 million people 
of 50 people, the staff does not get their share of the proceeds. This policy makes it very difficult 
for Netflix to capture talent in the competitive cinematographic industry. 
      8.2. Business Segment Evolution 
 
Netflix has three revenue streams: Domestic Streaming, referring to the content streaming 
service in the US market; International Streaming, referring to the content streaming service outside 











Figure 5 illustrates Netflix’s revenue per business segment from 2015 to 2017. Netflix’s 
Domestic Streaming segment contributed to 53% of the firm’s revenue in 2017, therefore being the 
largest source of revenue. This segment has, however, been decreasing in relative importance. It 
corresponded to 62% of total revenue in 2015 and, in 2017, it only amounted to 53%. Regarding 
Source: Netflix Annual Report 2017 
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International Streaming, it is the sector with the largest growth, increasing its weight on Netflix’s 
revenues from 29% in 2015 to 44% in 2017. At last, the Domestic DVD is the only sector whose 
revenue has been decreasing in both absolute and relative terms. Its weight was of about 9% in 
2015 and it fell to 4% in 2017. 












Global subscribers to Netflix’s services, streaming and DVD-by-mail, has achieved over 117,5 
million in the end of 2017. This growth has been driven by the acquisition of domestic and 
international subscribers, having Netflix acquired over 18 million international subscribers and 
over 5 million subscribers in the US in 2017 alone. The growth in the average revenue charged is 
explained by changes in plan mix and prices both in the US and abroad. Both these effects have 
been negatively affected by the DVD segment, in which the subscriber base and the average 
revenue charged per client have decreased. 
Consolidated revenues increased by 32% from 2016 to 2017, driven by the growth in revenues 
registered in both the domestic and international segments. 
 
Fig. 6 – Netflix Subscriber Evolution and Operating Results (in millions, except Avg. Revenue per subscriber) 













Figure 7 depicts that, despite the great increase in revenues from 2015 to 2016, both the gross 
margin and the operating margin decreased year-on-year, as a consequence of the aggressive 
expansion plan of Netflix and all its inherent costs. In 2017, both metrics have increased as revenue 
growth outpaced the growth in costs. The analysis of each individual segment, domestic, 
international and DVD-by-mail can be found in Appendix 1. 
8.4. Strengths & Opportunities 










Fig. 8 – Netflix Subscriber Base Evolution (in millions) 











Gross Margin Operating Margin
Source: Netflix Annual Report 2017 





Netflix’s most valuable asset is its subscriber base, as it is the driver that allows the firm to 
generate revenues. The subscriber growth rate has been particularly impressive in the International 
segment, boosted by Netflix’s aggressive growth strategy, its investment in creating content in 
languages other than English, having content in over 24 languages, and its free first month 
subscription policy. Moreover, the company believes it will continue adding more subscribers as 
the trend for binge watching grows in popularity. 
Chasing its goal of being the world leader content provider, Netflix is working not only on 
increasing its subscriber base but also on having a widely diverse one. To do so, the firm is 
undertaking initiatives such as creating more kids and family-oriented content. Moreover, in order 
to tackle the talent acquisition issues previously mentioned, in late 2016, Netflix stroke a deal with 
iPic Entertainment. According to the deal, Netflix originals will debut on iPic Entertainment 
theaters at the same time the movies are released online (Roettgers, 2017). The underlying logic is 
that this exposure improves Netflix’s ability to capture talent, as the movies will now appear on the 
big screen as it is the filmmakers’ wish. Most importantly, it will increase the visibility of the brand 
as well as opening these movies up for Oscar and Emmy nominations, which will ultimately boost 
subscriptions. Following this deal, Netflix went from 9 awards and 54 nominations in 2016 to 20 
awards and 91 nominations in 2017. Furthermore, Netflix hired Scott Stuber, a veteran Hollywood 
producer to be the head of its movie division (Netflix Media Center, 2018). Capitalizing on the 
success of its content, the firm has also developed show related games. It is not clear whether the 
firm will continue developing those nor how successful they were. 
      8.4.2. Platform Quality 
 
Netflix considers providing excellent accessibility to be vital. Unlike any of its competitors, 
Netflix collects and utilizes extensive amounts of data to, based on its costumers search profiles, 
suggest other content it considers appropriate for the user. Out of about 6.000 titles that constitute 
the firm’s portfolio, each costumer is shown the 50 to 75 titles that Netflix’s algorithm forecasts to 
be those the costumer is most likely to enjoy. Moreover, once one logs into the platform, it will 
never automatically log-off. These facts are particularly remarkable given that competitor 
platforms, like HBO Now, log users out frequently and require user authentication through the 
computer or smartphone, involving missing passwords and troubles that will not be found with 





analysis either to measure user preferences or study the type of shows that should be developed 
(Ekanadham, 2018). 
      8.5. Risks & Threats 
      8.5.1. Competition 
 
Netflix Media Center defines its competition, in a broad sense, as any vehicle through which 
an individual can spend time relaxing or getting any sort of stimuli, which may include “linear 
networks, pay-per-view content, DVD watching, other internet networks, video gaming, web 
browsing, magazine reading, video piracy, and much more.” The firm also acknowledges that, in 
respect to the source of entertainment they offer, the competition is rapidly increasing, with players 
such as Facebook, Snapchat, Apple and Twitter working on improving video quality on their 
platforms. Netflix’s investor relations department distinguishes the firm from these other sources 
of entertainment, claiming the firm “not to be a generic video company that streams all types of 
video such as news, user-generated, sports, porn, music video, gaming, and reality but rather as 
being a movie and TV series entertainment network”. Upon questioned regarding what it considers 
to be a concrete competitor of their business, the same department responds HBO. This answer is 
surprising, given that there are many other players in the market that may be considered to be much 
more of a threat to Netflix, however, it does signal the long-term vision of Netflix as premium 
content creator rather than a distributor of third party content. 
The firm’s vision for the future is that the market will be highly segmented. Costumers will 
not purchase access to one single service where all the content is available, but rather purchase 
access to various providers in order to be able to watch the original shows from each provider. This 
is not a convincing arguments, as having everything in one single place rather than having to access 
different platforms to watch different shows sounds like a simpler, more attractive approach. 
Furthermore, this market segmentation is what opens space for a substantial issue the industry 
faces: piracy. Video piracy is free, offers a very broad selection of content and, as a result, is a 
threat to Netflix. 
Piracy is a great issue that the industry faces, but Netflix’s competition does not consist of 
HBO and piracy alone. There are other players that, for their ability to offer enjoyable and relaxing 





to Netflix are those who offer products that are direct substitutes to the company’s product. In this 
category are Amazon, offering Amazon Prime Video, Hulu, a joint venture from 21st Century Fox, 
Walt Disney, Comcast and Time Warner, and HBO, also a Timer Warner company, offering HBO 
Now, which is extremely similar to Netflix. It should be pointed out that only Amazon Prime Video 
is available both inside and outside the US, being present in over 200 countries. The dissertation 
will proceed with a brief comparison between Netflix’s subscriber base, content expenditure and 











Figure 9 highlights Netflix’s superiority regarding subscriber amounts. Amazon Prime Video, 
coming in second with 44 million subscribers, is the most immediate threat to Netflix. However, 
the amount of Amazon Prime Video subscribers is different from its actual viewers. By subscribing 
to the Amazon Prime services, which offers a wide range of benefits, such as free shipping on 
Amazon products, a streaming-music library and cloud storage, consumers are automatically 
subscribing to Amazon Prime Video as well. It is not clear, however, how many of these 




Sources: Companies Websites 






















      In respect to content expenditure, in 2017, Netflix was the firm that registered the largest 
expenditure, spending over $6 billion, closely followed by Amazon Prime Video, who spent $4,5 














Netflix Amazon Prime Video Hulu HBO Now
Fig. 10 – Content Expenditure (in $ billions) 
Sources: Companies Websites 
Source: Business Insider 





Figure 11 compares the video content budget of Netflix and Amazon, the two largest players 
on the video streaming industry, both in respect to number of subscribers and content expenditure. 
The graph shows that Netflix has been spending more than Amazon on each of the year of analysis, 
however, the gap has been closing on a relative basis. In 2013 Netflix spent twice as much on 
content than Amazon Prime Video but in 2017 it only spent 33% more. 
Pricing is one of the most important characteristics for products that are as similar as the ones 





Amazon Prime offers unlimited streaming of tens of thousands of movies and TV shows. 
Unlike its main competitors, Amazon Prime also allows the rental of individual items. One can 
also choose to subscribe to Prime Video only for $8,99 a month or, for $99 a year, one can have 
access to the whole Amazon Prime package. Amazon’s 50%-off student discount, making the 
Amazon Prime service $49,50, has been a huge success, being by far the best option for students. 
Hulu’s service is priced at $7,99 for the basic package and $11,99 for the premium package, 
which is exactly the same of as the basic package, but advertisement free. HBO Now’s package 
costs almost two times more than Netflix’s basic package and the advantages do not seem obvious. 
HBO is known as being a premium content provider, having created some of the best shows around, 
like Game of Thrones, The Sopranos or Silicon Valley. However, Netflix’s content is renowned 
itself, with names like House of Cards, Orange is the New Black and Stanger Things. 
From the analysis of the three points above, subscriber base, content expenditure and pricing, 
Netflix seems to hold the leading position on the video streaming market regarding the first two, 
having been able to capture a wider subscriber base and highly invest to produce quality content. 
Fig. 12 – US Monthly Prices Comparison 





In respect to pricing, Netflix’s packages also appear to be priced competitively. Is there room for 
the firm to further increase its prices? 
      8.5.1.1. Pricing Power 
 
Upon the start of Netflix’s streaming service there was no benchmark as to which price would 
be reasonable for its services, other than linear TV services, which are often sold as a bundle. 
Resulting, Netflix’s pricing power over the past years has been remarkable, with the company 
raising the price on its standard package by over 35% in three years for new subscribers and, 
simultaneously, witnessing a 143% growth in its subscriber base, according to the firm’s annual 
report. 
It is expected that, as other products are launched in the following years, at lower or 
comparable prices, some potentially supported by ads (as is the case of Hulu), that Netflix’s price 
elasticity is unlikely to remain static. Moreover, Netflix’s service is dependent on its users having 
good internet connection. Lack of control over broadband prices is a limitation to Netflix’s ability 
to increase its prices. This should not apply to some countries where Netflix has only recently 
started operating, in which it is priced as a luxury product, for which price elasticity shouldn’t be 
as strong. At last, one more risk that Netflix is subject to regarding its pricing ability is bundling 
risk. Currently, Netflix is aligned in terms of pricing with services like Hulu, Amazon Prime Video 
or HBO Now, however, if it is to continue increasing its prices, it risks having to compete with 
bundles of services, which may include television access plus a streaming service for a similar 
price of Netflix’s streaming service alone. This is already the case with Amazon Prime, in which 
the streaming video platform comes as an extra to the accelerated delivery, music and cloud 
platforms, and the threat is expected to increase with the merge of Disney and Fox. 
      8.5.1.2. Disney-Fox Merge 
 
The Disney-Fox merge is expected to affect Netflix in several aspects, potentially being its 
biggest present threat. Disney is the number one provider of Netflix’s content for kids, content 
Disney has announced to be withdrawing in 2019. Moreover, through this deal, Disney will be the 
majority shareholder in Hulu. Fox is also the owner of the largest media network platform in India, 
Star Entertainment, therefore extending Disney’s influence to this large emerging market Netflix 





would allow Disney access to over 22 million customers in the UK, Ireland, Germany and Italy 
(Garrahan, 2017). This is, however, not certain yet, as Comcast has made a counter-offer to acquire 
Sky as a whole (Khan, 2018). Given the direct consequences of this merge, Disney is in an ideal 
position to either expand Hulu globally or to launch its own streaming content platform, leveraging 
on Fox’s distribution assets, or bundling this platform with a paid television subscription. In either 
scenario it is clear that this merge poses an eminent threat to Netflix’s business and it is unclear 
what the firm may do to respond. 
      9. Net Neutrality 
 
Competition is, without a doubt, Netflix’s most clear source of risk. As to net neutrality, it is 
not clear whether it is an opportunity or a risk for Netflix. Net neutrality is defined as “the principle 
that Internet service providers should enable access to all content and applications regardless of the 
source, and without favoring or blocking particular products or websites” (Oxford Dictionary, 
2018) This has been the situation in most countries in Europe and the US, one with net neutrality, 
meaning that, by purchasing access to the internet one has access to everything within the internet 
without having to pay anything extra to access any website. Moreover, net neutrality ensures that 
internet speed for all websites is the same, being impossible for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
to negotiate with companies tariffs in which consumers would experience faster internet speed 
when accessing to certain websites. In the US, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) 
has, on the 14th of December 2017, approved a law to repeal net neutrality. What are the 
implications for Netflix? In the past, the major internet companies have been extremely vocal 
regarding their opposition to a net neutrality repeal, as this repeal as seen as a great risk to their 
business. The argument was that repealing net neutrality would give unfair advantages to ISPs own 
content and offer a narrower range of options for consumers to access in the internet (Kastrenakes, 
2017). An example of how this repeal could adversely impact Netflix would be in the event of a 
merge between AT&T and Time Warner, which is in discussion. In a world without net neutrality 
this would mean that an extremely large ISP would own a streaming service provider, HBO, and 
would have the option to either block or highly slow down the streaming speed of Netflix, making 
HBO much more appealing to individuals who have access to the internet from them. Recently 
however, Netflix and the other very large internet companies, like Alphabet or Amazon do not 





logic seems to be that they do not think ISPs have the bargaining power to negotiate harmful terms 
with them anymore given the size that they have reached. Moreover, given their current bargaining 
power, they perceive it as an opportunity to establish dominance over the smaller players in the 
market. Given the risks mentioned and Netflix’s current attitude regarding the issue, it is not clear 
whether the company regards this change in regulation as a risk of an opportunity nor is it clear 
how will this impact the firm’s operations. 
      10. Valuation 
 
Netflix was valued in this dissertation using, as the main valuation methodology, the 
Discounted Cash-Flow Model, being the discount rate the WACC. Relative valuation was used as 
a complementary method to test the consistency of the DCF valuation. This dissertation will 
proceed with the explanation of each of the methods used, as well as the underlying assumptions 
of the models. At last, the valuation produced will be compared with the equity valuation on Netflix 
produced by Morgan Stanley on the 22nd of January 2018. 
      10.1. Discounted Cash-Flow Model - Assumptions 
      10.2. Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) 
 
EBIT, or operating income, consists of the firm’s revenues minus all of its operating expenses. 
These operating expenses are classified as cost of revenue, marketing expenses, technology & 
development expenses and general & administrative expenses. The dissertation will follow with 
the underlying assumptions for the evolution of each variable into the future. 
10.2.1. Drivers of Revenue 
Netflix’s future revenue was estimated as is the sum of the revenues from its three business 
segments. The revenue for each of the segments consists, with minor variations, of the product of 
the average revenue charged from each paid subscriber and the number of subscribers. The 
assumptions for the forecasts of the future revenue charged from each paid subscriber and the 





      10.2.1.1. Average Monthly Revenue per Paid Subscriber 
 
 
As previously mentioned, Netflix has had tremendous pricing power, having been able to 
historically increase its prices without compromising subscriber growth. As depicted above, the 
Domestic and International segments’ monthly revenue per paid subscriber are have evolved 
similarly from 2015 to 2017, while the DVD segment revenue per paid subscriber is slowly 
decreasing 
In respect to the Domestic and International segments, the main driver of growth in the revenue 
per paid subscriber in 2018 is the $1 increase in Netflix’s Standard package from $10,99 to $11,99 
and the $2 increase in the Premier package from $11,99 to $13,99, which was applied in the US 
and in most of the International segment on the beginning of 2018. In respect to both segments, the 
assumption for the future is that Netflix will be able to continue to increase the prices for its service 
at an ever smaller rate. The company is expected to increase its price once again in the end of 2018, 
most likely in its two cheapest packages, and then the growth rate is expected to severely decrease 
after 2019, given that it is the year in which Disney’s content will no longer be available in Netflix’s 
platform and that it is assumed that the firm’s competitors will start applying pricing pressure. 
From 2024 onwards it is assumed that Netflix’s prices will be increasing at a rate smaller than the 
inflation for both segments. In respect to the DVD-by-mail segment, it is expected that the average 
monthly revenue per paid subscriber will continue to decrease, following the historical trend. 
As mentioned, the firm’s revenue is a function of how much it charges from its subscribers 
and the number of subscribers it has. The number of subscribers is defined as the product of the 
size of the market in which Netflix operates or plans to operate in the future and Netflix’s ability 
to penetrate these markets. The forecast for each driver follows. 
Fig. 13 – Average Monthly Revenue per Paid Subscriber ($) 
 






      10.2.1.2. Market Size 
 
It is assumed that the size of the market in which Netflix operates, or plans to operate in the 
future, consists of every broadband home in the world, given that Netflix is a company with 
operations worldwide, excluding China. Appendix 2 contains both historical data from the 
evolution of broadband homes in each of the countries of analysis as well as the forecasted 
evolution for the amount of broadband homes. The underlying assumption is that, in 2017, the 
growth rate of broadband homes in the countries Netflix operates at will consist of the average 
growth rate of the past five years. This is the general rule for countries in which broadband homes 
evolution has been growing at a similar rate yearly. Exceptions to this rule are France, Germany, 
India and the item “Other excluding China”, who’s growth has been increasingly smaller year on 
year and, as a result, applying the past five year average would bias the results. For the years after 
2017 it is assumed that, for all countries, the growth rate will decrease, gradually converging to the 
population growth rate of the underlying country. 
      10.2.1.3. Market Penetration 
 
Appendix 3 contains the percentage of Netflix’s penetration of broadband homes in each of 
the countries of analysis in 2017, as well as the estimate for future penetration rates. Netflix’s future 
penetration is estimated as a function of competition, current market penetration, the state of the 
economy and the creation of content either in the native language of the target country or related 
to that country’s history. In respect to the first, competition, it is assumed that it will be increasingly 
difficult to keep on penetrating broadband homes as it is forecasted that there will be plenty of 
supply in the market. This effect is expected to be particularly felt from 2019 onwards, the year in 
which the Disney-Fox merge takes off and Disney’s content is removed from Netflix’s platform. 
Moreover, in the UK & Ireland, Germany, Japan and India Amazon is the market leader as 
streaming content provider, thus, in these countries, Netflix is expected to achieve a lower market 
penetration than in the countries in which this is not the case. Current market penetration is, 
naturally, a driver of future penetration as well. In countries in which market penetration is already 
high, as is the case in the US, it is expected that the incremental penetration in the years to come 
will be gradually lower. It should be noted, however, that the fact that Netflix has an estimated 
market penetration of X% in 2028 does not imply that there is only 100-X% of the market for its 





the services are perfectly comparable and quite expensive, it is reasonable to assume, and it is 
Netflix’s vision, that households will purchase access to more than one streaming service, 
especially if those are sold in bundles. Therefore, the fact that Netflix has an estimated market 
penetration of 63,3% in the US in 2028 does not imply that other competitor may not have a market 
penetration above 36,7% himself. Regarding the state of the economy, the underlying assumption 
is that the economy will continue to grow and there will be no recession during the period of 
analysis. Appendix 4 presents the implied world economy outlook. Finally, in respect to content 
creation in the native language of the target country, it is assumed that Latin America, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and the UK & Ireland will be countries in which Netflix will have very high 
penetration rates as a result of Netflix’s investment in shows in the native languages of these 
countries, or in which the history of the countries is addressed, such as La Casa de Papel, Las 
Chicas del Cable or The Crown to name a few. 
10.2.1.4. Number of Subscribers 
 
 
As stated, the number of Netflix’s subscribers is a function of market size and market 
penetration. Figure 14 depicts the number of subscribers per business segment, as well as the 
expected amount of paid subscribers. The existing difference between subscribers and paid 
Source:  Netflix Annual Report for historical data 
 






subscribers is due to the fact that it is Netflix’s policy that, upon subscribing the service, every new 
costumer is offered the first month free of payment. It is expected that, as Netflix stops being a 
novelty and starts having fewer new subscriptions that the ratio of paid subscribers to subscribers 
should increase. Appendix 5 details the forecasted number of subscribers per country. 
      10.3. Revenue  
 
 
Netflix’s yearly revenue is expected to consist of the product of the average monthly revenue 
from paid subscribers, the number of paid subscribers and the number of months in a year, twelve. 
However, the firm's revenue on its domestic and international segments has historically been 
marginally different from Paid Subscribers times Average Monthly Revenue per Paid Subscriber 
times 12, as depicted in Appendix 6. The underlying assumption is that this difference will be 
maintained in the Domestic Segment, as it has been static for the past years. In the International 
Segment, however, the difference has been decreasing and, as a result, it is assumed that the ratio 
in the International Segment will converge to the ratio of the Domestic Segment in the long run. 
For the DVD segment the average ratio of the past 3 years is assumed to remain constant into the 
future. 
      10.4 Cost of Revenue 
 
Netflix’s cost of revenue consists primarily of content amortization, relating to its existing and 
new streaming content. The company’s amortization policy for content is based on historical and 
estimated viewing patterns, being reviewed every quarter. Moreover, the firm states that its content 
library is amortized on an accelerated basis. Detailed information regarding the firm’s depreciation 
policy is, however, unavailable for investors or researchers. As a result, in the model, it is assumed 
that content amortization is a function of the company’s additions to streaming content. The 
Fig. 15 – Forecasted Revenue per Operating Segment (in $ million) 
 






dissertation will follow with the explanation of the reasoning behind the forecasts for the future 
additions to streaming content as well as the amortization policy. 
 
 
Annual additions to streaming content are assumed to consist of the sum of Netflix’s annual 
payments of its content obligations which will be due in the current year and additional cash spent 
in that year. Additional cash spent consists of content investments made by the company that do 
not refer to payments that were due. In each year, from 2015 onwards, the company has estimated, 
on its annual report, that its “unknown obligations are expected to be significant and could include 
approximately  $3 to $5 billion over the next three years, with the payments for the vast majority 
of such amounts expected to occur over the next twelve months”. Moreover, the company states 
that it expects to spend $10 to $12 billion in cash on content ($7-$8 billion will be the amortized 
expense in the income statement). It is forecasted that, for 2018, the additions to streaming content 
will be in the top of the range of the company’s predictions. For the following years it is assumed 
that the company will continue to increase its investment in streaming content at an ever slower 
pace, as its position in the market starts settling, which is reflected in an increasingly lower 
increment to content obligations due in less than one year as well as the additional cash spent, 




Fig. 16 – Forecasted Additions to Streaming Content (in $ million) 
 








Given the inability to accurately forecast the amortization of streaming content, for the reasons 
previously mentioned, this item will be estimated as a % of additions to streaming content. As 
stated, Netflix’s content library is amortized on an accelerated basis. For that reason, the average 
of the past three years of the historical amortization rate as a % of additions to streaming content 
will be assumed for 2018. For the following years it is assumed that this ratio should increase, as 
the firm’s growth starts to deaccelerate, converging to a steady state. 
 
 
The primary driver of Netflix’s cost of revenues is the amortization of streaming content, as 
previously explained. Its secondary driver, the non-content expenses, consists mostly of processing 
fees, expenses associated with service call centers and streaming delivery expenses. These 
expenses are assumed to continue to grow at the same growth rate of the company’s revenue. 
Fig. 18 – Forecasted Cost of Revenue (in $ million) 
 
Fig. 17 – Forecasted Amortization of Streaming Content (in $ million) 
 
Source:  Netflix Annual Report for historical data 
 






      10.5. Other Operating Costs 
      10.5.1. Marketing 
 
 
Netflix's marketing expenditures are assumed to move as a function of the firm's revenue. The 
firm only invests in marketing for its streaming services, being the expenditure in marketing for 
DVDs zero. It is assumed that marketing expenses will continue to grow in the future in absolute 
terms as the company's investment in content creation slows down and, with the increased 
competition, it is increasingly important for Netflix to remain relevant and have visibility in the 
markets it operates at. Naturally, given the differences in market sizes, marketing expenditure in 
the international segment is expected to be larger. 
      10.5.2. General & Administrative Costs 
 
 
General and administrative costs are also assumed to evolve as a function of Netflix’s revenue. 
These costs consist mainly of payroll for employees, professional fees and general corporate 
expenses. As the firm’s expansion slows down, given its nearly worldwide presence, it is expected 
that the costs associated with running the business stabilize, for which its percentage of revenues 
is expected to decrease over time. 
Fig. 20 – Forecasted General & Administrative Costs (in $ million) 
 
Fig. 19 – Forecasted Marketing Expenditures (in $ million) 
 
Source:  Netflix Annual Report for historical data 
 










Technology and development costs are assumed to move as a function of Netflix’s revenue as 
well. These consist of costs associated with improvements to Netflix’s service, such as tests, 
maintenance and modifications of the user interface, merchandising, streaming delivery 
technologies, telecommunication systems and infrastructures. Compensations for technology 
employees is also accounted for in this item. As the firm’s expansion slows down, given its nearly 
worldwide presence, it is expected that the costs associated with running the business stabilize, for 
which its percentage of revenues is expected to decrease over time. 
      10.6. Taxes 
 
 
In respect to Netflix’s tax policy, it is assumed that the company will pay the US corporate tax 
rate for the earnings it generates in the US. For the earnings generated abroad, it is assumed that 
Netflix will pay taxes in the country that offers the lowest corporate tax rate, as is the policy of 
most major technology companies. That country is expected to be Ireland, as shown in Appendix 
7. The blended tax rate consists of the weighted average tax rate, being the weights the revenues 
generated in either segment. Naturally, as the international segment gains more relevance and has 
a lower corporate tax rate indexed to it, the blended tax rate is expected to decrease. 
Fig. 21 – Forecasted Technology & Development Expenditures (in $ million) 
 
Source:  Netflix Annual Report for historical data 
 
Fig. 22 – Forecasted Corporate Tax Rate (in $ million) 
 






      10.7. Streaming Content Expenses 
 
 
Streaming content expenses constitute the most significant cash out-flow of Netflix, directly 
affecting shareholders’ and debtholders’ cash-flows. The computation of this value has been 
explained in the cost of revenue chapter. 
      10.8. Non-Cash Charges 
 
 
Depreciation was computed as a % of gross PP&E. The company has few tangible assets, 
resulting in a small amount of forecasted depreciations, in line with historical data. Content 
Amortization represents almost the entirety of this segment and has been detailed in the Cost of 
Revenue segment. 
      10.9. Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) 
 
 
Capital expenditures are expected to evolve as a percentage of Netflix’s revenue. Given that 
the firm’s expansion program has stabilized, it is expected that future CAPEX should be mainly 
referring to the maintenance of Netflix’s infrastructures rather than related to expansion, being, 
therefore, expected a slow evolution of this item. 
Fig. 24 – Forecasted Non-Cash Charges (in $ million) 
 
Source:  Netflix Annual Report for historical data 
 
Source:  Netflix Annual Report for historical data 
 
Fig. 25 – Forecasted Capital Expenditures (in $ million) 
 
Source:  Netflix Annual Report for historical data 
 






      10.10. Changes in Working Capital 
 
 
The changes in working capital shown above refer to the company’s changes in operating 
working capital, or non-cash working capital, given that cash was not included. Other current assets 
are assumed to evolve as a % of revenues. Other Current Assets to Revenue ratio has always been 
around 3%, except in 2017, in which it increased to 5%. The underlying assumption is that the ratio 
will continue to be 3% from 2017 onwards, thus explaining the lower value of changes in other 
current assets in 2018 in respect to the future years. Deferred taxes, accounts payable and accrued 
expenses have also been computed as a function of revenue. 
      11. Discounted Cash-Flow – Valuation 




Fig. 26 – Changes in Working Capital (in $ million) 
 
Source:  Netflix Annual Report for historical data 
 
Source:  Netflix Annual Report for historical data 
 


























Fig. 28 – Forecasted Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
 
Sources: Bloomberg, Reuters and Damodaran Academic Website 
 
Fig. 29 – Estimated Net Debt (in $ million) 
 
Fig. 30 – Estimated Fair Value of Equity 
 





        Netflix’s estimated fair value of equity is $107.255 million. The company has 448,1 million 
shares outstanding, as a result, the forecasted fair price per share is of $239,35. As of the 15th of 
May 2018 Netflix’s shares were trading in the market at $328,53. The valuation presented values 
the firm as of the end of 2018. Being assumed that the firm’s stock price should converge to its fair 
value at some point in time, the implicit recommendation is that investors should sell the firm’s 
stock, as its price should decline in the future. 
        12. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
        Equity valuation requires the usage of assumptions for the construction of valuation models. 
Given that assumptions often differ from the reality, it is important to measure how changes in the 
inputs of the valuation models, in this case, in the DCF model, may affect its output. Below are 
presented two sensitivity analysis, the first being for the effect of a change in the DCF discount 
factor, the WACC, and perpetual growth rate simultaneously, and the second being for the effect 
of changes in the main drivers of Netflix’s FCFF, content expenditure and revenue per paid 
subscriber.  In respect to the first, the WACC sensitivity is computed as a function of changes in 
Netflix’s beta. The reason for this assumption is that the firm’s WACC is essentially composed by 
the firm’s cost of equity, given Netflix’s low D/E ratio in market values. Since Netflix’s cost of 
equity was estimated based on the CAPM, in which the only firm specific factor is beta, it is the 
most important variable affecting the company’s WACC. Moreover, Netflix’s beta substantially 
differs depending on the period of analysis used for its computation, as shown below on Figure 31. 
The beta chosen the cost of equity calculation of Netflix was the 5 year beta. The reasoning for this 
choice can be found in Appendix 9. 
 
         
 
 
Fig. 31 – Beta across different periods of analysis 
 






         
 
        Figure 32 illustrates how changes in the WACC and perpetual growth rate affect the DCF 
model price per share output. The row above the WACC refers to its underlying beta. The market 
price of reference is Netflix’s stock price as of the 15th of May 2018, $328,53. As depicted above, 
minor changes in either factor greatly impact Netflix’s price per share output, however, for the 
recommendation provided by this model to be buy rather than sell the DCF model would need to 
be both significantly overestimating the firm’s WACC and underestimating its perpetual growth 




        Figure 33 depicts how variations in the assumptions for Netflix’s content expenditure and 
revenue per paid subscriber affect the firm’s stock price. The left table shows that even in a situation 
in which the firm could spend 20% less on content per year, maintaining its subscriber and revenue 
per paid subscriber growth rates, would the recommendation be a sell rather than a buy. On the 
right it is shown how variations in the monthly revenue per paid subscriber affects the stock price. 
      
 100% 95% 90% 85% 80% 
Price per Share 239,35 257,6 275,8 294,1 312,3 
      
      
 100% 105% 110% 115% 120% 
Price per Share 239,35 270,4 301,4 332,5 363,5 
Fig. 32 – Sensitivity Analysis of WACC and Perpetual Growth Rate (in $, except WACC and Perpetual Growth Rate) 
 










It highlights that only if the revenue per paid subscriber would be 15% higher on each of the years 
of analysis, without compromising subscriber growth and assuming the same levels of content 
expenditure, would the recommendation be a buy rather than a sell. Both scenarios seem unlikely 
to represent the reality of Netflix. 
        13. Relative Valuation 
        13.1. Peer Group Selection 
 
        Netflix defines its competition very broadly, saying that its competition is every company that 
occupies people's time. Furthermore, Netflix offers both content production and distribution 
services, which traditionally had been a two-company job. There is no other company in the world 
operating solely on this segment, which explains the great success of Netflix in acquiring 
subscribers. This uniqueness makes it a difficult task to build a peer group of similar companies, 
as there aren’t any that replicate this business model with a high degree of similarity. 
        In the face of Netflix's success, and what appears to be the start of an industry shift, the large 
US based traditional players in the content creation business have created a joint venture, Hulu, to 
offer their content straight to the consumer without the need for a middle man. In response to this 
change, distribution companies themselves and content creators have been in a spree of mergers 
and acquisitions of each other, among which the bidding offer of AT&T to Time Warner and the 
bidding offer of Disney to 21st Century Fox must be pointed out. It is not clear, however, if these 
companies will effectively be Netflix’s competitors in the future. Throughout their history most 
media firms have had indirect relationships with the consumers of content, since it was the content 
distributor’s job to fill that gap. This consumer distance has certainly created major organizational 
and cultural differences among the traditional media corporations and a company like Netflix. 
These organizations, whose costumers are content distributors, for the nature of their business are 
more focused on variables of the likes of minimum distribution guarantees or inclusion in bundles, 
rather than customer satisfaction. 
        The giants of the internet world, namely Apple, Alphabet, Amazon and Facebook have been 
showing interest in expanding into the streaming business. The desire to expand to this business 
segment has been shown differently from company to company. In Apple’s case, for instance, the 





than 38 million subscribers. Amazon has created Amazon Prime Video. Alphabet has been 
developing YouTube Red, a music, series and films streaming platform, while Facebook has been 
heavily investing on improving the video quality in its platform, under the premise that login into 
Netflix to watch a show is a deliberate act of searching for entertainment when you have free time 
while, if one can find similar sources of entertainment in Facebook, such as short, high quality 
shows, the time consumers spend there can be much increased and a real threat to Netflix's business. 
        Given the heterogeneity of companies that may be considered Netflix’s peers and Netflix's 
position in this industry, which isn't one of a distributor nor a content producer alone, the two types 
of companies are included in Netflix's broad peer group. 
       
 
        Netflix’s broad peer group was selected from a combination of Bloomberg, Reuters and 
Morningstar suggested peer groups, with minor adjustments given that some of the companies 
suggested by those sources have, for instance, as core business the management of amusement 
parks, for which they are not even part of the company’s broad peer group. Moreover, Facebook 
Fig. 34 – Broad Peer Group 
 






and Apple are not considered peers of Netflix by any of the mentioned sources. In this valuation 
these will be included for the reasons previously stated. 
        The companies shown on the table above were narrowed down to the final peer group 
according to the five criteria shown: area of operations, market capitalization, revenue growth rate, 
return on invested capital (ROIC) and beta. Area of operations is a decision criteria given that it is 
assumed that companies that operate in the same geographical area are subject to the same type of 
risks and opportunities. For this reason, companies whose operations are either highly concentrated 
in the US or abroad are not considered to be suitable peers for Netflix, whose revenues come from 
both sources in a nearly equal proportion. 
        Market capitalization is a measure of size. Companies of different sizes are subject to different 
risks and growth opportunities. As a result, it is also a decision criteria. This criteria, however, is a 
soft criteria. Amazon, despite being over five times larger than Netflix is terms of market 
capitalization will not be excluded from the peer group as it is the company who has invested the 
most in the streaming business segment and that has the most potential to be a real competitor of 
Netflix, for which it cannot be cut-out, despite the major size difference. Apple and Alphabet, 
despite not being considered competitors as strong as Amazon, are also not excluded by this criteria 
as it would not be coherent. Discovery, Lions Gate Entertainment and AMC Networks have been 
excluded due to this criteria as all these companies have a market capitalization inferior to $10 
billion. 
        Revenue growth rate is, naturally, a measure of growth. Companies that are in different stages 
of the business life cycle are subject to different risks and opportunities. For that reason, it is a 
decision criteria. Netflix seems to be on a late phase of the rapid growth stage of its development, 
while some of its potential peers are clearly already mature firms or in the decline stage already, as 
is the case of Viacom or CBS Corporation, while others seem to be in the early stage of their rapid 
growth stage, like Altice or Snap Inc, for which they have been excluded. The selection criteria 
was that all companies with revenue growth rates lower than 5% or higher than twice Netflix’s 
growth rate would be excluded. 
        Revenue growth alone is irrelevant if shareholders cannot get a return on their investment, for 





All the companies whose ROIC is more than double or less than half of Netflix’s ROIC have been 
excluded from the firm’s final peer group. 
        Beta is a measure of market risk, as it reflects how a stock behaves in respect to the broad 
stock market. For companies to be considered peers its investors should be subject to the similar 
levels of risk, for which it is a decision criteria, as suggested by (Damodaran, 2005). The 
computation of the betas of Netflix’s peer group was performed in the same manner as Netflix’s 
beta itself, which is explained in Appendix 9. The beta from all the companies on the table is 
comparable to Netflix’s beta, as a result, no company was excluded. 
        13.2. Multiples Valuation 
        
 
        The decision for the usage of each of the multiples above is presented in the conclusion of the 
literature review. As expected, given Netflix’s unique business and resulting poor peer group, the 
values differ significantly across the different multiples used and from the value obtain with the 
Source: Reuters for NTM multiples 
 
Fig. 35 – Final Peer Group 
 






DCF model, which is regarded as the most accurate model of the two. As a result of the 
inconsistency of the results achieved from this valuation method, the recommendation provided by 
this analysis is of limited reliability, for which the final recommendation from this dissertation 
consists of the recommendation built with the DCF model rather than the one from the multiples. 
        14. Valuation Comparison 
 
 
       Figure 37 depicts the FCFF evolution in this dissertation in comparison to Morgan Stanley’s 
equity research report FCFF. Morgan Stanley’s report assumes that the company’s FCFF will be 
positive for the first time in the year 2021, while in the dissertation’s forecasts the company 
achieves a positive FCFF in 2020. The main difference across both valuations is that, in the 
dissertation, it is assumed that Netflix’s FCFF will grow the quickest in the following years, until 
2024, and then the absolute growth is expected to slow down. Morgan Stanley, on the contrary, 
assumes that the FCFF absolute increments will be ever larger as time goes by. Morgan Stanley 
provides very little information regarding its assumptions for the evolution of Netflix’s FCFF, 
however, the difference appears to consists of different assumptions regarding the evolution of 
competition for the firm and how it will affect Netflix’s ability to continue increasing the prices of 
its packages and penetrating new markets. Morgan Stanley, appears to believe that the firm’s FCFF 
will continue to increase at an ever higher pace, indicating forecasted limited competition, which 
is does not go in line with the expectations for competition describer in this dissertation.  Both 
researches are estimating the value of Netflix as of the end of 2018. 
Fig. 37 – FCFF Comparison 
 







       The WACC presented in the dissertation is 12 basis points higher than Morgan Stanley’s 
WACC. The main drivers of this difference are the risk-free rate, the beta and the forecasted capital 
structures. The risk free rate has substantially increased from the 23rd of January 2018, date in 
which Morgan Stanley report was published. In respect to the betas, the difference across each 
valuation should be explained by a difference in market index, time interval of analysis or return 
interval, however, Morgan Stanley does not specify how beta was estimated. At last, the bank 
forecasts a D/E ratio in perpetuity of 25%, which indicates that it is the bank’s view that Netflix 
will need to highly increase its leverage down the line. This forecasted capital structure is high 
compared to the company’s current D/E ratio in market values of 5,85% and does not go in line 
with this dissertation’s prediction regarding the evolution of Netflix’s capital structure, as it is 
expected that the firm will not further expand its operations and will be free cash-flow positive in 







# Shares Outstanding 448,1 
Enterprise Value 111.583 
Value of Equity 107.583 
Price per Share (15 May 2018) $328,53 
Implied Fair Price $239,35 
Recommendation SELL 
 Morgan Stanley 
# Shares Outstanding 448,1 
Enterprise Value 130.475 
Value of Equity 123.534 
Price per Share (22 Jan. 2018) $227,58 
Implied Fair Price $275,68 
Recommendation BUY 
Fig. 38 – DCF Assumptions Comparison 
 






        15. Conclusion 
 
        The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a buy or sell recommendation regarding Netflix’s 
common stock. The two valuation methods used in this dissertation were the Discounted Cash-
Flow methodology, discounted at the WACC, and the relative valuation methodology. The 
recommendation provided by this dissertation is a sell recommendation, which is solely based on 
the DCF approach. The reason for this lies on the fact that the relative valuation methodology, for 
the uniqueness of Netflix’s business and the difficulty in finding suitable peers, yielded price per 
share estimates ranging from $185,59 to $751,68, not showing consistency and, therefore, not being 
suitable as neither a valuation recommendation nor as a benchmark for the DCF approach. 
        The sensitivity analysis built for the DCF approach shows that even the smallest variation in 
any of the inputs of the model highly affects the model’s output. Nevertheless, due to the large 
difference between the value at which Netflix’s stock is trading and the implied fair value provided 
by the model, the deviations from the DCF model assumptions necessary for the recommendation 
to be a buy rather than a sell appear not to be plausible. 
        The answer to this dissertation’s research question, the fair value of one unit of Netflix’s 
common stock at the end of 2018, is $239,35. Given that Netflix’s stock is trading at $328,53 as of 
the 15th of May 2018, being assumed that the firm’s stock price should converge to its fair value at 
some point in time, the implicit recommendation is that investors should sell the firm’s stock, as 
its price should decline in the future. 
        At last, it must be mentioned that this dissertation acknowledges that the company has had a 
remarkable track record of understanding costumer needs and desires over its history and has 
proven to have an extremely effective management team who has guided the company to success 
despite several mistakes over its history, for which it is recognized that some premium to the 
valuation, which is not incorporated into the valuation models, might be earned. However, it is 
expected that the company should face massive competition and it is unclear which tools Netflix 
possesses that might enable it to compete with companies with powerful brands and large balance 
sizes like Disney, Apple, Google, Time Warner, Facebook, Amazon, among others, which have 
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        Revenue in the Domestic Streaming market consists of the monthly fee paid by Netflix‘s 
subscribers solely in the US. The growth in revenue from about $4 billion in 2015 to over $6 billion 
in 2017 has been driven by both an increase in paid subscribers of over 22% during the same period, 
from about 44 million subscribers to 54 million subscribers, and an increase in the average revenue 
charged to the subscribers from $8,50 per month to $10,18 per month, resulting from changes in 
price and plan mix. 
        In respect to the cost of revenue, its largest component is the amortization of Netflix’s 
streaming content. From 2015 to 2017, even though the absolute value of the cost of revenue has 
been increasing, in percentage of the revenue there has been a decline, from about 60% to 54%.  
        Contribution profit is defined as the revenue of a segment minus the cost of revenues and 
marketing expenses incurred by that segment. It is an important metric because it allows investors 
to analyze the operating performance of each sector separately, before global corporate costs. The 
contribution margin for the domestic segment is positive and has been increasing over the past 
years, reflecting a growth in paid subscriptions and revenue that outpaces the firm’s costs. Netflix 
aim is to continue to increase its contribution margin over the following years, stating that they are 
willing to cut expenditure to achieve this target. 
Subscribers 2015 2016 2017 
Net Additions 5,62 4,69 5,32 
Subscribers 44,74 49,43 54,75 
Paid Subscribers 43,40 47,91 52,81 
Average Revenue per Paid Subscriber $8,50 $9,21 $10,18 
Operation Results 2015 2016 2017 
Revenue $4.180 $5.077 $6.153 
(-) Cost of Revenue $2.487 $2.856 $3.319 
(-) Marketing $318 $383 $553 
Contribution Profit $1.376 $1.839 $2.280 
Contribution Margin (%) 33% 36% 37% 
    
Fig. 40 – Netflix Subscribers and Contribution Profit in the US (in millions, except Avg. Revenue per Paid Sub.) 














      
 
        The revenue for the International Streaming market consists of the monthly fee paid by 
Netflix’s subscribers outside the US. This segment’s revenue has had a remarkable growth over 
the past three years, driven by a 110% growth in the number of international subscribers, which 
are now more than the domestic subscribers, as well as an increase on the average revenue charged 
to the subscribers from $7,48 to $8,66. This average price increase was driven by changes in price 
and plan mix, just like it happened in the domestic market, and boosted by favorable fluctuations 
in the foreign exchange rates. Netflix does not use hedging derivatives to mitigate its FX exposure, 
engaging only in natural hedging, consisting of paying its international suppliers in local currency, 
from the revenues collected in that country. The International Streaming revenue stream is gaining 
great importance in Netflix’s business. The average price charged to international subscribers is 
still lower than the price charged on the domestic market, as it is Netflix’s strategy to penetrate 
new markets with low prices and gradually increase those. 
        In respect to the cost of revenue, the trend seems favorable, as it has been decreasing in 
percentage of the revenue, from over 95% in 2015 to 81% in 2017. 
        International marketing expenses have been, on average, 50% higher than the Domestic 
marketing expenses over the period of analysis. This difference is explained by the market size 
differences as well as by the fact that Netflix is penetrating new markets where it needs to build 
awareness for its service, while it already has a strong brand in the US. 
Subscribers 2015 2016 2017 
Net Additions 11,75 14,41 18,47 
Subscribers 30,02 44,37 62,83 
Paid Subscribers 27,44 41,19 57,83 
Average Revenue per Paid Subscriber $7,48 $7,81 $8,66 
Operation Results 2015 2016 2017 
Revenue $1.868 $3.211 $5.089 
(-) Cost of Revenue $1.780 $2.911 $4.138 
(-) Marketing $506 $608 $725 
Contribution Profit $(333) $(309) $227 
Contribution Margin (%) (17)% (10)% 4% 
    
Fig. 41 – Netflix Subscribers and Contribution Profit outside the US (in millions, except Avg. Revenue per Paid 
Sub.) 





        At last, contribution profit was positive for the first time in 2017, increasing $551,1 million 
from its 2016 result, as profit growth in Netflix’s most mature international markets outpaced 
expenditure in newer markets. The contribution margin increased by 21%, from (17)% in 2015 to 
4% in 2017. It is still at a great distance from the contribution margin of 37% in the US, but there 
is great market potential, as Netflix is now a company operating worldwide with a positive 












        
        The DVDs (and Blu-Ray) business only operates in the US. The revenues for this segment 
consist of the monthly fee paid by Netflix‘s subscribers solely in the US. The revenues are declining 
and Netflix estimates that this decline will continue down the road. However, Netflix does not 
expect that demand for this service will fade in following years, as it is expected that there will be 
some persistent level of demand for DVDs, coming mostly from rural areas where broadband 
access is not as available or affordable.  
        Cost of revenue for this segment consists mostly of delivery expenses, such as packaging and 
postage costs, expenses associated with content and other expenses related with the processing of 
DVDs and customer service centers. These costs are mainly variable costs, as a result, they vary 
greatly with the level of shipments, which is determined by the amount of subscribers. The growth 
in the contribution margin, from 50% in 2015 to 55% in 2017, as the number of paying subscribers 
and average revenue charged from those subscribers decreases, signals that paying subscribers are 
Subscribers 2015 2016 2017 
Net Additions (0,87) (0,79) (0,73) 
Subscribers 4,90 4,11 3,38 
Paid Subscribers 4,79 4,03 3,33 
Average Revenue per Paid Subscriber $10,30 $10,22 $10,17 
Operation Results 2015 2016 2017 
Revenue $646 $542 $450 
(-) Cost of Revenue $324 $263 $203 
(-) Marketing $- $- $- 
Contribution Profit $322 $280 $248 
Contribution Margin (%) 50% 52% 55% 
    
Fig. 42 – Netflix Subscribers and Contribution Profit for DVDs (in millions, except Avg. Revenue per Paid Sub.) 





renting fewer DVDs: Netflix is collecting the monthly fee from its clients and they are not using 
the service they are paying for. This ultimately leads to believe that those too will cancel their 





 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017f 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
United States 
88,3 92,5 96,0 97,8 102,2 106,3 110,4 114,2 117,6 120,6 123,0 124,8 126,4 127,7 128,6 129,5 130,4 131,2 
Growth Rate YoY 
 4,75% 3,80% 1,85% 4,50% 4,03% 3,79% 3,50% 3,00% 2,50% 2,00% 1,50% 1,25% 1,00% 0,75% 0,70% 0,7% 0,7% 
Canada 
11,3 11,7 12,1 12,6 13,0 13,4 13,8 14,2 14,6 14,9 15,2 15,5 15,7 15,9 16,1 16,3 16,5 16,5 
Growth Rate YoY  3,61% 3,46% 3,92% 3,68% 2,74% 3,02% 3,0% 2,5% 2,3% 2,0% 1,8% 1,5% 1,3% 1,2% 1,20% 1,20% 0,85% 
UK & Ireland 
21,7 22,8 24,2 25,0 26,0 26,5 27,4 28,1 28,7 29,1 29,5 29,8 30,0 30,2 30,4 30,7 30,9 31,1 
Growth Rate YoY  5,26% 6,28% 3,13% 4,03% 2,13% 3,34% 2,5% 2,0% 1,5% 1,3% 1,0% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 
Latin America 
37,3 41,3 44,9 48,5 52,6 55,9 58,7 61,4 64,0 66,5 68,9 70,9 72,7 74,3 75,8 77,2 78,3 79,5 
Growth Rate YoY  12,6% 21,43% 4,29% 5,15% 5,50% 4,98% 4,5% 4,3% 4,0% 3,5% 3,0% 2,5% 2,3% 2,0% 1,8% 1,5% 1,5% 
Nordics 
8,7 8,9 9,2 9,5 9,8 10,1 10,4 10,7 10,9 11,2 11,4 11,6 11,8 12,0 12,2 12,3 12,4 12,5 
Growth Rate YoY  2,27% 3,35% 3,38% 3,42% 2,74% 3,03% 2,8% 2,5% 2,3% 2,0% 2,0% 1,8% 1,5% 1,3% 1,0% 0,8% 0.8% 
Netherlands 
6,5 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,2 7,3 7,5 7,6 7,7 7,8 7,9 8,0 8,1 8,2 8,2 8,2 8,3 
Growth Rate YoY  2,40% 2,07% 0,87% 2,60% 1,99% 2,00% 1,8% 1,8% 1,5% 1,5% 1,3% 1,3% 1,0% 0,8% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 
France 
22,7 24,0 24,9 26,0 26,9 27,7 28,5 29,3 30,1 30,8 31,5 32,2 32,9 33,5 34,0 34,4 34,7 35,1 
Growth Rate YoY  5,41% 4,00% 4,13% 3,46% 2,97% 3,00% 2,8% 2,8% 2,5% 2,3% 2,3% 2,0% 1,8% 1,5% 1,3% 1,0% 1,0% 
Germany 
27,3 28,0 28,6 29,6 30,7 32,0 33,0 34,0 35,0 35,8 36,7 37,5 38,3 38,9 39,5 40,1 40,6 41,1 
Growth Rate YoY  2,56% 2,45% 3,25% 3,84% 4,21% 3,26% 3,0% 2,8% 2,5% 2,4% 2,3% 2,0% 1,8% 1,5% 1,5% 1,3% 1,3% 
Austria 
2,1 2,1 2,2 2,4 2,5 2,5 2,6 2,7 2,8 2,9 3,0 3,0 3,1 3,2 3,2 3,3 3,3 3,4 
Growth Rate YoY  1,57% 4,79% 5,69% 4,07% 2,77% 3,78% 3,5% 3,3% 3,0% 2,8% 2,5% 2,3% 2,0% 1,8% 1,8% 1,3% 1,3% 
Belgium 
3,5 3,7 3,8 4,0 4,1 4,3 4,4 4,6 4,7 4,9 5,0 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,8 
Growth Rate YoY  4,21% 3,68% 4,78% 2,74% 3,62% 3,81% 3,5% 3,3% 3,0% 2,8% 2,8% 2,5% 2,3% 2,0% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% 
Switzerland 
3,1 3,2 3,4 3,5 3,7 3,8 4,0 4,1 4,2 4,4 4,5 4,6 4,7 4,8 4,9 5,0 5,1 5,2 
Growth Rate YoY  4,35% 7,04% 0,76% 7,27% 2,05% 4,29% 3,5% 3,3% 3,0% 2,8% 2,5% 2,5% 2,3% 2,0% 2,0% 1,8% 1,8% 
Luxembourg 
0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 
Growth Rate YoY  0,0% 4,14% 5,68% 4,84% 4,10% 3,75% 3,8% 3,8% 3,5% 3,3% 3,3% 3,0% 3,0% 2,8% 2,8% 2,5% 2,5% 
Australia 
5,6 5,7 6,0 6,5 6,8 7,4 7,8 8,2 8,6 9,1 9,5 9,9 10,3 10,6 11,0 11,4 11,7 12,1 
Growth Rate YoY  3,30% 4,29% 9,28% 4,47% 8,00% 5,87% 5,5% 5,0% 4,8% 4,5% 4,3% 4,0% 3,8% 3,5% 3,3% 3,0% 3,0% 
Japan 
35,7 36,1 36,9 37,8 38,9 39,8 40,7 41,5 42,2 42,9 43,4 43,8 44,3 44,6 44,9 45,2 45,4 45,6 
Growth Rate YoY  1,22% 2,18% 2,36% 2,87% 2,40% 2,20% 2,0% 1,8% 1,5% 1,3% 1,0% 1,0% 0,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 
Spain/PT/Italy 
26,9 27,7 28,8 30,2 31,6 33,1 33,1 34,3 35,5 36,6 37,7 38,8 39,7 40,6 41,5 42,2 42,8 43,5 
Growth Rate YoY  2,78% 4,15% 4,92% 4,43% 4,64% 4,18% 3,8% 3,5% 3,3% 3,0% 2,8% 2,5% 2,3% 2,0% 1,8% 1,5% 1,5% 
India 
13,4 15,0 14,9 15,8 16,9 18,7 20,0 21,3 22,5 23,8 25,0 26,1 27,3 28,5 29,6 30,7 31,8 32,9 
Growth Rate YoY  12,2% -0,37% 5,51% 7,57% 10,10% 7,01% 6,5% 6,0% 5,5% 5,0% 4,8% 4,5% 4,3% 4,0% 3,8% 3,5% 3,5% 
Other exc.China 
127,3 144,3 160,4 174,9 192,3 208,9 226,7 245,4 265,0 285,5 307,7 330,7 355,0 380,8 408,2 436,8 467,4 500,1 
Growth Rate YoY  
13,3% 11,22% 9,01% 9,96% 8,63% 8,50% 8,3% 8,0% 7,8% 7,8% 7,5% 7,4% 7,3% 7,2% 7,0% 7,0% 7,0% 
Total 353 381 408 433 463 492 519 547 577 606 637 668 699 732 765 799 835 873 
Source: World Bank (for historical data) 
 

































2017 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
United States  
49% 52,0% 54,8% 56,8% 58,5% 59,8% 60,8% 61,5% 62,0% 62,5% 63,0% 63,3% 
Growth Rate YoY   3,0% 2,8% 2,0% 1,8% 1,3% 1,0% 0,8% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,3% 
Canada Sept-10 
46% 47,8% 49,3% 50,8% 52,3% 53,8% 55,0% 56,2% 57,2% 58,2% 59,2% 60,0% 
Growth Rate YoY   1,8% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5% 1,3% 1,2% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,8% 
UK & Ireland Jan-12 
39% 42,0% 44,5% 46,0% 47,0% 47,8% 48,3% 48,8% 49,3% 49,8% 50,3% 50,6% 
Growth Rate YoY   3,0% 2,5% 1,5% 1,0% 0,8% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,4% 
Latin America Sept-11 
26% 34,0% 38,5% 42,0% 45,0% 47,5% 49,8% 51,8% 53,3% 54,8% 55,8% 56,3% 
Growth Rate YoY   8,0% 4,5% 3,5% 3,0% 2,5% 2,3% 2,0% 1,5% 1,5% 1,0% 0,8% 
Nordics Oct-12 
41% 43,5% 45,8% 47,8% 48,8% 49,5% 50,0% 50,5% 50,8% 51,0% 51,3% 51,5% 
Growth Rate YoY   2,5% 2,3% 2,0% 1,0% 0,8% 0,5% 0,5% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 
Netherlands Sept-13 
20% 23,3% 26,3% 29,3% 31,3% 32,8% 34,0% 35,0% 35,8% 36,5% 37,0% 37,5% 
Growth Rate YoY   3,3% 3,0% 3,0% 2,0% 1,5% 1,3% 1,0% 0,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,5% 
France Sept-14 
12% 19,0% 25,5% 30,5% 34,5% 38,0% 40,5% 42,8% 44,8% 46,5% 48,0% 49,2% 
Growth Rate YoY   7,0% 6,5% 5,0% 4,0% 3,5% 2,5% 2,3% 2,0% 1,8% 1,5% 1,2% 
Germany Sept-14 
10% 15,5% 20,5% 24,5% 28,0% 30,5% 32,5% 34,0% 35,3% 36,3% 37,3% 38,3% 
Growth Rate YoY   5,5% 5,0% 4,0% 3,5% 2,5% 2,0% 1,5% 1,3% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 
Austria Sept-14 
16% 24,5% 30,5% 34,5% 38,0% 40,0% 42,0% 43,5% 44,5% 45,0% 45,5% 46,0% 
Growth Rate YoY   8,5% 6,0% 4,0% 3,5% 2,0% 2,0% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 
Belgium Sept-14 
16% 24,5% 30,5% 34,5% 37,5% 40,0% 41,5% 42,5% 43,3% 43,8% 44,3% 44,8% 
Growth Rate YoY   8,5% 6,0% 4,0% 3,0% 2,5% 1,5% 1,0% 0,8% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 
Switzerland Sept-14 
15% 23,5% 29,5% 33,5% 38,0% 41,0% 43,5% 45,8% 47,8% 49,5% 51,0% 52,3% 
Growth Rate YoY   8,5% 6,0% 4,0% 4,5% 3,0% 2,5% 2,3% 2,0% 1,8% 1,5% 1,3% 
Luxembourg Sept-14 
27% 35,5% 41,5% 45,5% 48,5% 51,0% 53,0% 54,5% 55,5% 56,5% 57,0% 57,5% 
Growth Rate YoY   8,5% 6,0% 4,0% 3,0% 2,5% 2,0% 1,5% 1,0% 1,0% 0,5% 0,5% 
Australia Mar-15 
25% 33,5% 39,5% 43,5% 45,5% 47,5% 49,0% 50,5% 51,5% 52,5% 53,5% 54,3% 
Growth Rate YoY   8,5% 6,0% 4,0% 2,0% 2,0% 1,5% 1,5% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,8% 
Japan Sept-15 
7% 11,0% 14,5% 17,0% 19,0% 20,5% 21,8% 22,8% 23,8% 24,8% 25,5% 26,3% 
Growth Rate YoY   4,0% 3,5% 2,5% 2,0% 1,5% 1,3% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 0,8% 0,8% 
Spain/PT/Italy Oct-15 
10% 16,5% 22,0% 26,5% 30,5% 34,0% 36,5% 38,8% 40,8% 42,8% 44,3% 45,5% 
Growth Rate YoY   6,5% 5,5% 4,5% 4,0% 3,5% 2,5% 2,3% 2,0% 2,0% 1,5% 1,3% 
India Jan-16 
5% 9,5% 13,0% 15,0% 16,5% 17,5% 18,3% 19,0% 19,5% 20,0% 20,3% 20,6% 
Growth Rate YoY   4,5% 3,5% 2,0% 1,5% 1,0% 0,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,5% 0,3% 0,3% 
Other exc.China - 
3% 4,0% 5,0% 5,8% 6,5% 7,3% 7,9% 8,5% 9,0% 9,3% 9,5% 9,8% 
Growth Rate YoY  - 1,0% 1,0% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 0,6% 0,6% 0,5% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 
Source: Netflix Annual Report for historical data 
 
Fig. 44 – Penetration of Broadband Homes Evolution (in %) 
 
 







        Appendix 4 - World Economy Outlook 
 
        Netflix is a streaming company whose internationalization process has been extremely 
aggressive over the past decade. As a result, it is important not only to understand what the 
economy outlook for the US is but also for the rest of world. It should be noted that the product 
Netflix offers is not a basic need for its customers, meaning that, facing adverse economic 
scenarios, it is expected to be one of the first expenses to be cut. 
        In respect to the US, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its previous growth 
forecast to 2.7% in 2018 and 2,5% in 2019 from 2,3% and 1,9% respectively. This revision comes 
as a consequence of a higher expected external demand and a positive expected effect of the 
reduction in corporate tax rates. This forecast assumes that the reduction in government revenues 
will not affect public expenditure in the short-run and will, as a result, stimulate short-term business 
activity in US, leading also to an increase in domestic demand. The IMF projects that the US real 
GDP will be 1,2% higher in 2020 as a consequence of the corporate tax reduction than it would be 
had this policy not been put into motion. The strong growth expected in the following years should 
be offset by a lower expected growth from 2022 onwards, as a consequence of an increase in the 
fiscal deficit. 
        The IMF considers that, due to strong momentum in domestic demand and high external 
demand, the growth rates for the euro zone are expected to increase even further, particularly for 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. The prospects for Spain are not as bright, as a consequence of 
political uncertainty on citizens’ confidence and demand. In the non-euro countries of Europe, the 
IMF estimates growth rates of more than 5% for Poland and Turkey, as a result of a more favorable 
external environment, leading to more external demand and cheaper financing opportunities. 
        Globally, according to the IMF, the economic growth of 2017 was the broadest synchronized 
growth upsurge since 2010 and high-frequency hard data and sentiment indicators suggest that this 
momentum is expected to continue for the following years, suggesting good market conditions for 










Domestic 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
United States 33,4 39,1 44,7 49,4 54,8 59,4 64,4 68,4 72,0 74,6 76,8 78,5 79,7 81,0 82,1 83,1 
Growth YoY - 17,10% 14,40% 10,48% 10,76% 8,48% 8,45% 6,24% 5,15% 3,67% 2,94% 2,25% 1,57% 1,51% 1,46% 1,13% 
DVD 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
United States 6,3 5,7 4,9 4,1 3,4 2,7 2,2 1,9 1,7 1,5 1,4 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,2 
Growth YoY - -9,94% -14,19% -16,33% -17,07% -20,0% -17,5% -15,0% -12,5% -10,0% -7,50% -5,00% -2,50% -1,50% -0,75% -0,75% 






International Launching Date 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
Canada Set-10 3,8 4,3 4,9 5,5 6,0 6,8 7,2 7,6 7,9 8,3 8,6 8,0 9,2 9,4 9,7 9,9 
growth YoY   26,8% 19,8% 10,9% 9,8% 13,2% 5,7% 5,4% 5,0% 4,7% 3,9% 3,5% 2,9% 2,8% 2,6% 2,1% 
UK & Ireland jan-12 3,5 5,7 7,8 9,2 10,7 11,8 12,8 13,4 13,9 14,2 14,5 14,7 15,0 15,3 15,5 15,8 
growth YoY   64,9% 36,5% 18,4% 16,1% 10,4% 8,1% 4,9% 3,5% 2,6% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% 1,7% 1,6% 
Latin America set-11 3,1 5,1 9,5 13,9 17,7 20,9 24,6 27,9 31,0 33,7 36,2 38,5 40,4 42,0 43,5 44,8 
growth YoY   65,9% 86,4% 45,5% 27,4% 18,1% 18,0% 13,5% 10,9% 8,7% 7,4% 6,4% 5,0% 4,1% 3,4% 3,0% 
Nordics out-12 1,1 1,9 2,8 3,3 3,9 4,6 5,0 5,3 5,6 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,3 6,3 6,4 
growth YoY   78,7% 46,2% 20,3% 18,1% 18,6% 7,8% 6,7% 4,1% 3,6% 2,8% 2,5% 1,8% 1,5% 1,3% 1,3% 
Netherlands set-13 0,3 0,7 1,0 1,2 1,5 1,7 2,0 2,3 2,4 2,6 2,7 2,8 2,9 3,0 3,0 3,1 
growth YoY   151,9% 48,5% 22,5% 19,9% 16,9% 14,9% 13,1% 8,4% 6,1% 5,1% 4,0% 3,0% 2,6% 1,9% 1,9% 
France set-14  0,4 0,8 1,4 3,1 5,6 7,7 9,4 10,9 12,3 13,3 14,3 15,2 16,0 16,7 17,2 
growth YoY    91,0% 78,3% 127,8% 79,3% 37,9% 22,6% 15,7% 12,6% 8,7% 7,4% 6,2% 5,2% 4,3% 3,4% 
Germany set-14  0,4 0,7 1,3 3,0 5,3 7,2 8,8 10,3 11,4 12,4 13,2 13,9 14,5 15,1 15,7 
growth YoY    108,0% 77,6% 128,8% 78,3% 35,9% 22,5% 17,0% 11,4% 8,7% 6,4% 5,2% 4,4% 4,0% 4,0% 
Austria set-14  0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,7 0,9 1,0 1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,4 1,5 1,5 1,5 
growth YoY    133,3% 43,4% 70,1% 55,5% 28,5% 16,5% 13,2% 7,9% 7,4% 5,6% 4,1% 2,9% 2,4% 2,4% 
Belgium set-14  0,1 0,3 0,4 0,7 1,1 1,4 1,7 1,9 2,1 2,2 2,3 2,4 2,5 2,5 2,6 
growth YoY    152,0% 56,3% 76,4% 61,7% 28,5% 16,5% 11,7% 9,6% 6,3% 4,7% 3,8% 2,9% 2,9% 2,9% 
Switzerland set-14  0,1 0,2 0,3 0,5 1,0 1,2 1,5 1,7 1,9 2,0 2,2 2,3 2,5 2,6 2,7 
growth YoY    148,0% 67,7% 71,5% 79,8% 29,6% 17,0% 16,6% 10,6% 8,7% 7,5% 6,5% 5,7% 4,8% 4,2% 
Luxembourg set-14  0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 
growth YoY    90,0% 47,4% 75,0% 58,3% 21,3% 13,5% 10,1% 8,6% 7,0% 5,9% 4,6% 4,6% 3,4% 3,4% 
Australia / New 
Zealand mar-15   1,0 1,6 2,3 2,8 3,4 3,9 4,3 4,7 5,0 5,4 5,7 6,0 6,3 6,5 
growth YoY     57,7% 46,4% 17,7% 23,8% 15,4% 9,3% 8,8% 7,3% 6,9% 5,5% 5,3% 5,0% 4,4% 
Japan set-15   0,7 1,5 2,9 4,6 6,1 7,3 8,2 9,0 9,6 10,1 10,7 11,2 11,6 12,0 
growth YoY     128,8% 96,2% 56,4% 34,1% 19,0% 13,2% 9,0% 7,2% 5,4% 5,2% 4,7% 3,5% 3,5% 
Spain / Portugal / 
Italy out-15   0,5 1,3 3,1 5,7 7,8 9,7 11,5 13,2 14,5 15,7 16,9 18,0 18,9 19,8 
growth YoY     163,0% 139,2% 79,9% 38,0% 24,4% 18,5% 14,5% 10,0% 8,6% 7,3% 6,7% 5,1% 4,4% 
India jan-16    0,4 1,1 2,0 2,9 3,6 4,1 4,6 5,0 5,4 5,8 6,1 6,4 6,8 
growth YoY      152,9% 87,9% 45,1% 21,7% 15,5% 11,1% 9,0% 8,5% 6,7% 6,4% 4,8% 5,0% 
Other worldwide 
(excluding China) After Jan-16    3,1 6,2 9,8 13,2 16,4 20,0 24,0 28,0 32,4 36,7 40,4 44,4 48,8 
growth YoY           98,4% 59,6% 35,0% 23,9% 21,8% 19,9% 16,6% 15,8% 13,5% 10,0% 9,9% 9,8% 
Total   18,3 30,0 44,4 62,8 84,3 103,6 119,8 134,9 148,9 161,4 173,6 184,8 194,8 204,3 213,7 





      Appendix 6 – Revenue and Paid Subscribers * Monthly Revenue per Paid 
Subscriber * 12 Comparison 
 
 
Domestic 2015 2016 2017 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
Revenue 4.180 5.077 6.153 7.747 9.476 10.599 11.552 12.287 12.935 13.458 13.806 14.120 14.405 14.669 
PaidSub*MonthRev*12 4.427 5.294 6.451 8.135 9.950 11.129 12.129 12.902 13.582 14.131 14.496 14.827 15.125 15.403 
Revenue as % 94% 96% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 
 
International 2015 2016 2017 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
Revenue 1.868 3.211 5.089 8.521 12.128 15.331 18.328 21.170 23.768 26.357 28.628 30.592 32.412 34.393 
PaidSub*MonthRev*12 2.463 3.860 6.010 9.574 13.551 17.035 20.140 23.010 25.835 28.341 30.783 32.806 34.666 36.589 
Revenue as % 76% 83% 85% 89% 90% 90% 91% 92% 92% 93% 93% 93% 94% 94% 
 
 
DVD 2015 2016 2017 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
Revenue 646 542 450 353 290 248 216 194 179 169 165 162 160 159 
PaidSub*MonthRev*12 592 494 406 327 269 229 200 179 165 157 152 150 148 147 
Revenue as % 109% 110% 111% 108% 108% 108% 108% 108% 108% 108% 108% 108% 108% 108% 
Fig. 46 – Revenue and Paid Subscribers*Monthly Revenue per Paid Subscriber*12 Comparison 
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Other (exc. China) 24% 
Fig. 47 – Corporate Tax Rate per Country 
 
























                 
        
 
 
         Netflix’s equity risk premium is calculated as the weighted average equity risk premium of 
the countries in which Netflix operates. Given the inexistence of data regarding Netflix’s revenue 
per country, in order to compute the weights, the number of subscribers per country was used. The 
underlying assumption is that the price charged across the globe is always the same and that 
subscribers alone are the driver of revenue. Despite not being a precise estimate for the weights it 
should be a close approximation, as Netflix’s packages pricing does not vary significantly from 
country to country. 
Country Equity Risk Premium Weight 
Canada 5,08% 4,95% 
UK & Ireland 5,67% 8,84% 
   United Kingdom 5,65% - 
   Ireland 6,06% - 
Latin America 8,18% 14,60% 
   Mexico 6,46% - 
   Brazil 8,54% - 
   Colombia 7,27% - 
   Argentina 11,42% - 
Nordics 5,18% 3,23% 
   Denmark 5,08% - 
   Finland 5,54% - 
   Norway 5,08% - 
   Iceland 6,46% - 
   Sweden 5,08% - 
Netherlands 5,08% 1,23% 
France 5,65% 2,56% 
Germany 5,08% 2,44% 
Austria 5,54% 0,35% 
Belgium 5,78% 0,57% 
Switzerland 5,08% 0,44% 
Luxembourg 5,08% 0,04% 
Australia / New Zealand 5,08% 1,94% 
Japan 5,89% 2,41% 
Spain / Portugal / Italy 7,34% 2,60% 
   Spain 7,27% - 
   Portugal 7,96% - 
   Italy 7,27% - 
India 7,27% 0,89% 
Other (Exc, China) 9,78% 5,08% 
United States 5,08% 48,06% 
 
 
Fig. 48 – Equity Risk Premium per Country 
 






        The value of “Other (Exc. China)” was calculated as the average of the equity risk premium 


























      Appendix 9 – Levered Beta Calculation 
 
        Beta measures the risk of an asset in respect to a benchmark. The estimation of a company’s 
beta is a process that involves a series of decisions, the first being the choice of a market index to 
reflect the market portfolio. Naturally, there is no single index that does it, as the market is too vast 
for any individual index to cover. Given the impossibility to select such an index, the alternative is 
selecting one that is the closest possible estimate of a market index. The NYSE composite or the 
Wilshire 5000 do cover many stocks, however, these are equal weighted indexes, which are poor 
reflections of the market index. As a result, the most common index of choice by analysts is the 
S&P 500, as it covers a significant number of stocks and is market weighted. This is also the index 
of choice in this dissertation. 
        The second choice refers to the return interval, which may be daily, weekly, monthly, 
quarterly or annually. Damodaran (1999) states that betas estimated using daily or weekly returns 
are likely to have significant biases due to non-trading problems. The author adds that, using such 
small return intervals will lead illiquid firms to report lower betas than they really should and liquid 
firms to report higher betas than justified. Given the shortfalls pointed out by the author, the return 
interval of chosen was monthly returns. 
        The third and last decision required consists of the selection of the period for the analysis, as 
there is a trade-off: more observations against the possible irrelevance of past information. 
Damodaran (1999) suggests that one should go back further in time when estimating the beta for 
firms that have remained stable in terms of business mix and leverage. Both variables have stayed 
relatively flat during the past years. Netflix has quickly expanded its area of operations over the 
past years and has issued considerable amounts of debt to fund this expansion, as it has had negative 
free cash-flows. However, due to the stock price momentum the company has been witnessing, its 
D/E ratio in market value hasn’t changed significantly, nor has the company increased the range of 
products it offers. As a result, according to Damodaran (1999), the usage of the 5 year beta seems 

















         
 
        In order to compute the firm’s beta the stock prices as of the first of each month over the past 
five years, for Netflix and the ETF SPY, which tracks the S&P500 index, were collected from 
Yahoo Finance. These stock prices are adjusted for dividends and stock splits. Afterwards, the 
monthly return for both the SPY and Netflix were computed and the regression depicted on Figure 











Fig. 49 – Estimated 5Y Beta 
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          Appendix 10 – Cost of Debt and Market Value of Debt 
 
           
 
 









        Netflix’s cost of debt is computed as a function of the firm’s credit rating, provided by 
Moody’s, which is Ba2. On the table above can be seen that, for large market capitalization 
companies in this rating bracket, the appropriate spread over the risk free rate is 2,38%. As a result, 









Interest Coverage Ratio   
From To Rating Spread 
-100000 0,199999 D2/D 18,60% 
0,2 0,649999 C2/C 13,95% 
0,65 0,799999 Ca2/CC 10,63% 
0,8 1,249999 Caa/CCC 8,64% 
1,25 1,499999 B3/B- 4,37% 
1,5 1,749999 B2/B 3,57% 
1,75 1,999999 B1/B+ 2,98% 
2 2,2499999 Ba2/BB 2,38% 
2,25 2,49999 Ba1/BB+ 1,98% 
2,5 2,999999 Baa2/BBB 1,27% 
3 4,249999 A3/A- 1,13% 
4,25 5,499999 A2/A 0,99% 
5,5 6,499999 A1/A+ 0,90% 
6,5 8,499999 Aa2/AA 0,72% 
8,50 100000 Aaa/AAA 0,54% 
Source: Damodaran Academic Website 
 






           
        Market value of debt was estimated using the excel formula “PV”. Netflix does not have debt 
in any form other than bonds. All the information on the table can be found in Netflix’s annual 
report, except the bonds Yield to Maturity (YTM), which was extracted from Netflix’s yield curve 
from Reuters and the information regarding the bond issued in April 2018, as the 2018 annual 













Issuance Date Maturity Date Time to Maturity Principal at Par Coupon Rate # Annual Coupons YTM Bonds Market Value 
April-2018 April-2028 
 
11 1900 5,88% 2 5,948% 
 
$1888,92 
Oct-2017 April-2028 11 1600 4,875% 2 5,948% $1462,84 
May-2017 May-2027 10 1562 3,625% 2 5,732% $1314,12 
Oct-2017 Nov-26 9 1000 4,375% 2 5,606% $913,92 
Feb-2015 Feb-2022 5 700 5,500% 2 4,811% $721,21 
Feb-2015 Feb-2025 8 800 5,875% 2 5,462% $821,18 
Feb-2014 Mar-24 7 400 5,750% 2 5,290% $410,65 
Feb-2013 Feb-2021 4 500 5,375% 2 4,493% $515,98 




     
Fig. 51 – Market Value of Debt Computation 
 























         
 
 
          The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has forecasted the GDP growth rate for the 
following five years for all the countries for which there is data available. Despite the fact that the 
explicit period for Netflix’s valuation is of ten years, therefore going until 2028, it is assumed that 
the forecasted GDP growth rate from 2028 onwards will be equal to the forecasted GDP growth 
rate for 2023. Given the inexistence of data regarding Netflix’s revenue per country, in order to 
compute the weights, the number of subscriber per country was used. The underlying assumption 
Country GDP Growth Rate 2023f  Weight 
Canada 1,6% 4,95% 
UK & Ireland 1,7% 8,84% 
   United Kingdom 1,6% - 
   Ireland 2,8% - 
Latin America 2,7% 14,60% 
   Mexico 2,9% - 
   Brazil 2,2% - 
   Colombia 3,5% - 
   Argentina 3,3% - 
Nordics 1,7% 3,23% 
   Denmark 1,7% - 
   Finland 1,2% - 
   Norway 1,9% - 
   Iceland 2,6% - 
   Sweden 1,9% - 
Netherlands 1,9% 1,23% 
France 1,6% 2,56% 
Germany 1,2% 2,44% 
Austria 1,5% 0,35% 
Belgium 1,5% 0,57% 
Switzerland 1,7% 0,44% 
Luxembourg 3% 0,04% 
Australia / New Zealand 2,6% 1,94% 
Japan 0,5% 2,41% 
Spain / Portugal / Italy 1,2% 2,60% 
   Spain 1,7% - 
   Portugal 1,2% - 
   Italy 0,8% - 
India 8,2% 0,89% 
Other (Exc. China) 3,9% 5,08% 
United States 1,4% 48,06% 
 
 
Fig. 52 – Perpetual Growth Rate 
 








is that the price charged across the globe is always the same and that subscribers alone are the 
driver of revenue. Despite not being a precise estimate for the weights it should be a close 
approximation as Netflix’s packages pricing does not vary significantly from country to country, 
          The value of “Other (Exc. China)” was calculated as the average of the forecasted GDP 





          Appendix 12 – Forecasted Financial Statements 
 
 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
Revenue 4.375 5.505 6.780 8.831 11.693 16.622 21.895 26.178 30.095 33.651 36.881 39.984 42.597 44.874 47.044 49.221 
(-) Cost of Revenue 3.117 3.753 4.591 6.030 7.660 9.178 10.789 11.972 13.163 14.132 14.976 15.924 16.788 17.333 18.065 18.779 
Gross Profit 1.258 1.752 2.189 2.801 4.033 7.443 11.105 14.206 16.932 19.518 21.905 24.060 25.809 27.542 28.979 30.442 
(-) General & Administrative 180 270 407 578 864 1.247 1.708 2.094 2.182 2.271 2.397 2.399 2.449 2.468 2.493 2.510 
(-) Marketing 470 607 824 991 1.278 2.080 2.701 3.165 3.609 3.926 4.296 4.517 4.657 4.743 4.959 5.088 
(-) Technology & Development 379 472 651 852 1.053 1.512 1.861 2.160 2.408 2.608 2.766 2.899 .2982 3.141 3.175 3.199 
(-) Unusual Expense (Income) 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Operating Income 204 403 307 380 838 2.604 4.836 6.787 8.733 10.713 12.446 14.245 15.720 17.189 18.351 19.644 
(-) Interest Expense -32 -53 -164 -119 -353 -471  -471  -471  -471  -471  -443  -387  -331  -275  -220  -164  
Net Income Before Taxes 172 349 142 261 485 2.133 4.365 6.316 8.262 10.242 12.003 13.858 15.389 16.914 18.131 19.480 
(-) Provision for Income Taxes 59 83 19 74 -153 355 711 1.012 1.307 1.603 1.863 2.134 2.353 2.573 2.745 2.934 
Net Income 113 266 123 187 559 1.778 3.654 5.304 6.955 8.639 10.140 11.724 13.036 14.341 15.387 16.546 
Assumptions 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
G&A as % of Revenue 4,1% 4,9% 6,0% 6,5% 7,4% 7,5% 7,8% 8,0% 7,3% 6,8% 6,5% 6,0% 5,8% 5,5% 5,3% 5,1% 
Technology & Development as % of Revenue 8,7% 8,6% 9,6% 9,6% 9,0% 9,1% 8,5% 8,3% 8,0% 7,8% 7,5% 7,3% 7,0% 7,0% 6,8% 6,5% 
Interest Expense as % of LTD 6,4% 5,8% 6,8% 3,5% 5,4% 5,6% 5,6% 5,6% 5,6% 5,6% 5,6% 5,6% 5,6% 5,6% 5,6% 5,6% 
Corporate Tax Rate 34,3% 23,8% 13,4% 28,4% -31,5% 16,6% 16,3% 16,0% 15,8% 15,7% 15,5% 15,4% 15,3% 15,2% 15,1% 15,1% 










 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
Assets ($ Millions)                  
Cash & Equivalents 605 1.114 1.810 1.467 2.823 3.721 4.373 6.397 10.156 15.861 22.732 30.874 40.436 51.564 64.022 77.942 
Short Term Investments 595 495 501 266 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other Current Assets 1.858 2.319 3.121 3.987 4.847 6.065 7.346 8.442 9.380 10.150 10.860 11.522 12.119 12.645 13.113 13.528 
   Other Current Assets 151 152 215 260 536 563 742 887 1.020 1.141 1.250 1.355 1.444 1.521 1.595 1.669 
   Current Content Assets 1.706 2.166 2.906 3.726 4.310 5.501 6.603 7.555 8.360 9.009 9.610 10.166 10.675 11.123 11.519 11.860 
Total Current Assets 3.058 3.928 5.432 5.720 7.670 9.785 11.719 14.839 19.537 26.011 33.592 42.395 52.555 64.209 77.135 91.471 
Property/Plant/Equipment, Total - Net 134 150 173 250 319 483 664 826 982 1.115 1.235 1.339 1.435 1.520 1.594 1.659 
Intangibles, Net 2.091 2.773 4.313 7.275 10.371 13.942 17.738 21.544 25.340 29.019 32.422 35.576 38.459 40.999 43.240 45.172 
Other Long Term Assets 129 192 285 341 652 828 1.060 1.338 1.657 2.014 2.405 2.829 3.280 3.756 4.255 4.777 
Total Assets 5.412 7.043 10.203 13.586 19.012 25.038 31.182 38.547 47.515 58.158 69.653 82.139 95.729 110.484 126.224 143.078 
                  
Liabilities ($ Millions)                  
Accounts Payable 108 202 253 313 360 574 756 904 1.039 1.161 1.273 1.380 1.470 1.549 1.624 1.699 
Accrued Expenses 54 69 140 198 315 582 766 916 1.204 1.346 1.475 1.599 1.704 1.795 1.882 1.969 
Current Port. of LT Debt/Capital Leases 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Customer Advances 216 275 347 443 619 619 619 619 619 619 619 619 619 619 619 619 
Other Current Liabilities 1.776 2.117 2.789 3.633 4.173 5.485 7.006 8.115 9.029 10.095 11.064 11.995 12.779 13.462 14.113 14.766 
Total Current Liabilities 2.154 2.663 3.529 4.587 5.467 7.260 9.147 10.554 11.890 13.222 14.432 15.594 16.572 17.425 18.238 19.053 
                  
Total Long Term Debt 500 914 2.400 3.394 6.529 8.429 8.429 8.429 8.429 8.429 7.929 6.929 5.929 4.929 3.929 2.929 
Other Liabilities, Total 1.425 1.607 2.049 2.927 3.436 3.935 4.537 5.191 5.868 6.541 7.187 7.787 8.362 8.923 9.464 9.956 
Total Liabilities 4.079 5.184 7.978 10.908 15.432 19.623 22.113 24.174 26.187 28.192 29.547 30.309 30.863 31.277 31.630 31.938 
                  
Shareholders’ Equity ($ Millions)                  
Common Stock 0 1.043 1.325 1.600 1.871 1.927 1.927 1.927 1.927 1.927 1.927 1.927 1.927 1.927 1.927 1.927 
Additional Paid-In Capital 777 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Retained Earnings (Accumulated Deficit) 552 819 942 1.129 1.731 3.509 7.163 12.467 19.422 28.061 38.200 49.924 62.961 77.302 92.688 109.235 
Other Equity, Total 3 -5 -44 -49 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 -21 
Total Equity 1.332 1.857 2.223 2.680 3.581 5.415 9.069 14.373 21.328 29.967 40.106 51.830 64.867 79.208 94.594 111.141 
                  
Total Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity 5.411 7.041 10.201 13.588 19013 25.039 31.182 38.547 47.515 58.159 69.654 82.140 95.729 110.484 126.225 143.079 








 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
Cash Flow-Operating Activities                 
Net Income 113 266 123 187 559 1.778 3.654 5.304 6.955 8.639 10.140 11.724 13.036 14.341 15.387 15.387 
Depreciation 48 54 62 58 72 85 92 114 145 169 194 215 235 251 266 266 
Amortization of Intangibles 2.193 2.728 3.485 4.868 6.259 7.186 8.165 8.835 9.556 10.099 10.556 11.132 11.683 11.954 12.426 12.426 
Deferred Taxes -22 -30 -59 -47 -209 -176 -232 -278 -319 -357 -391 -424 -452 -476 -499 -499 
Stock Based Compensation 22 41 76 150 380 499 602 654 677 673 645 600 575 561 541 541 
Changes in Working Capital -2.256 -3.043 -4.437 -6.688 -8.847 -10.184 -11.355 -12.330 -12.953 -13.216 -13.459 -13.786 -14.184 -14.167 -14.323 -14.323 
Other Assets -2.988 -3.782 -5.753 -8.606 -10.040 -11.974 -13.243 -13.737 -14.290 -14.548 -14.669 -14.948 -15.163 -15.020 -15.135 -15.135 
   Additions to Streaming Content -3.050 -3.774 -5.772 -8.653 -9.806 -11.947 -13.064 -13.592 -14.157 -14.427 -14.560 -14.842 -15.074 -14.943 -15.062 -15.062 
   Other Current Assets 62 -9 19 47 -234 -27 -179 -145 -133 -121 -110 -105 -89 -77 -74 -74 
Accounts Payable 18 84 52 32 75 214 182 148 135 123 112 107 90 79 75 75 
Accrued Expenses 2 56 49 69 114 267 185 150 288 142 129 124 105 91 87 87 
Other Current Liabilities 720 652 1.235 1.869 1.078 1.312 1.521 1.109 913 1.067 969 931 784 683 651 651 
Other Assets & Liabilities, Net -9 -52 -18 -52 -74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cash from Operating Activities 98 17 -749 -1.474 -1.786 -811 926 2.299 4.060 6.007 7.685 9.461 10.893 12.465 13.799 13.799 
                  
Cash Flow-Investing Activities                   
Capital Expenditures -120 -145 -169 -185 -227 -249 -274 -275 -301 -303 -313 -320 -330 -337 -341 -341 
Sale/Maturity of Investment 408 527 364 423 343 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Purchase of Investments -550 -427 -372 -187 -75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other Investing Cash Flow 6 1 -2 -1 -7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cash from Investing Activities -256 -43 -179 50 34 -249 -274 -275 -301 -303 -313 -320 -330 -337 -341 -341 
                  
Cash Flow-Financing Activities                   
Financing Cash Flow Items 72 82 63 55 -32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Issuance (Retirement) of Stock, Net 125 61 78 37 88 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Issuance (Retirement) of Debt, Net 280 399 1.500 1.000 3.021 1.900 0 0 0 0 -500 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 
Cash from Financing Activities 476 542 1.640 1.092 3.077 1.956 0 0 0 0 -500 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 
                  
Foreign Exchange Effects -3 -5 -16 -9 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                  
Starting Cash 290 606 1.116 1.812 1.470 2.826 3.721 4.373 6.397 10.156 15.861 22.732 30.874 40.436 51.564 51.564 
Net Changes in Cash 316 510 696 -342 1.355 895 652 2.024 3.759 5.704 6.871 8.142 9.562 11.128 12.457 12.457 
End Cash 606 1.116 1.812 1.470 2.826 3.721 4.373 6.397 10.156 15.861 22.732 30.874 40.436 51.564 64.022 64.022 







Assumptions 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018f 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f 2025f 2026f 2027f 2028f 
Depreciation of PPE 27% 26% 26% 19% 18% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
Amortization as a % of Additions to 
Streaming Content 72% 72% 60% 56% 64% 60% 63% 65% 68% 70% 73% 75% 78% 80% 83% 85% 
Stock Based Compensation as % of 
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